Stonewalled by \u3cem\u3eSeawall\u3c/em\u3e: New York Decision Impedes Legislative Solutions to Affordable Housing Shortage by Sleep, Suzanne K.
University of Miami Law School
Institutional Repository
University of Miami Law Review
1-1-1991
Stonewalled by Seawall: New York Decision
Impedes Legislative Solutions to Affordable
Housing Shortage
Suzanne K. Sleep
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Law
Review by an authorized administrator of Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact library@law.miami.edu.
Recommended Citation
Suzanne K. Sleep, Stonewalled by Seawall: New York Decision Impedes Legislative Solutions to Affordable Housing Shortage, 45 U. Miami L.
Rev. 467 (1991)
Available at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr/vol45/iss2/9
Stonewalled by Seawall: New York Decision
Impedes Legislative Solutions to Affordable
Housing Shortage
I. INTRODUCTION ......................................................... 468
II. HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE TAKINGS CLAUSE .......................... 474
A. Permanent Physical Occupations .................................... 476
B. Regulatory Takings ......................................... 480
1. THE PENN CENTRAL FACTORS ................................... 480
a. As-Applied Economic Analysis ............................... 481
b. Facial Attacks ............................................. 483
2. THE NOLLAN TEST ............................................... 484
3. CONCEPTUAL SEVERANCE ........................................ 486
III. THE SEA WALL HOLDING AND REASONING ............................... 493
A. Physical Taking .................................................. 493
B. Regulatory Taking ................................................ 495
IV. ANALYSIS OF SEA WALL ................................................... 498
A . Physical Taking ................................................... 498
B. Regulatory Taking ................................................ 501
1. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ............................................. 501
2. ENDS/MEANS ANALYSIS .......................................... 506
C. Conclusion ....................................................... 509
V. ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVE PROGRAMS IN LIGHT OF SEA WALL ............ 510
A. Preservation Programs ............................................. 511
1. THE ORDINANCE ................................................. 511
2. ANALYSIS UNDER SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE ............... 512
3. ANALYSIS UNDER SEA WALL ........................................ 513
B. Anti-Warehousing Programs ........................................ 514
1. THE ORDINANCE ................................................. 514
2. ANALYSIS UNDER SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE ............... 515
3. ANALYSIS UNDER SEAWALL ..................................... 517
C. Anti-Displacement Programs ........................................ 518
1. THE ORDINANCE ................................................. 518
2. ANALYSIS UNDER SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE ............... 519
3. ANALYSIS UNDER SEA WALL ........................................ 520
D. Linkage ..................................................... 520
1. SAN FRANCISCO .................................................. 521
a. The Ordinance ............................................. 521
b. Analysis Under Supreme Court Jurisprudence .................. 522
c. Analysis Under Seawall ..................................... 524
2. BOSTON ....................................................... 525
a. The Ordinance ............................................. 525
b. Analysis Under Supreme Court Jurisprudence .................. 526
c. Analysis Under Seawall ..................................... 528
3. MIAMI .......................................................... 528
VI. CONCLUSION ............................................................. 529
VII. APPENDIX: CHECKLIST FOR PROPOSED LEGISLATION ..................... 531
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:467
I. INTRODUCTION
Homelessness is increasing primarily because of a lack of afforda-
ble housing.' Since 1981, funding for federal housing has declined by
seventy-five percent, exacerbating the problem. 2 Local governments
3
are seeking solutions to the housing crisis by implementing innovative
programs designed to preserve or create housing for the poor.4 The
recent experience of New York City ("City"), chronicled in the recent
case Seawall Associates v. City of New York,5 is a sad example of the
difficulty municipalities face in trying to balance the rights of the poor
against the rights of private property owners.
One important source of low-income housing is single room
occupancy units ("SRO's").6 SRO's are low-cost residential hotels,
rooming houses, or converted apartment buildings in which people
rent single, furnished rooms.7 SRO's contain shared bathroom and
kitchen facilities, and often include management services, such as
twenty-four-hour desk service, telephone switchboards, linens, and
1. Of 27 cities surveyed by the U.S. Conference of Mayors, every city cited the lack of
housing affordable by low-income people as the main cause of homelessness. U.S.
CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, A STATUS REPORT ON HUNGER AND HOMELESSNESS IN
AMERICA'S CITIES: 1989, at 2 (1989); see also NATIONAL COALITION FOR THE HOMELESS,
HOMELESSNESS IN THE UNITED STATES: BACKGROUND AND FEDERAL RESPONSE-A
BRIEFING PAPER FOR CONGRESSIONAL CANDIDATES 74 (1988) [hereinafter NATIONAL
COALITION].
2. Since 1981, the federal budget for subsidized and public housing programs has been
cut from $32 billion to $7.5 billion. NATIONAL COALITION, supra note 1, at 75. But see
Ellickson, The Homelessness Muddle, 99 PUB. INTEREST 45, 54 (1990) (arguing that "[flederal
spending on low-income housing programs actually increased sharply during the 1980s"
because the Reagan administration simply shifted funding from one low-income housing
program to another).
3. Municipalities must wrestle with the growing problem of homelessness because there is
no federal constitutional right to housing. See, e.g., Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972)
("Absent a constitutional mandate, the assurance of adequate housing and the definition of
landlord-tenant relationships are legislative, not judicial functions."). The Housing Act of
1937 and the Brooke Amendment have conferred benefits upon tenants that "are sufficiently
specific and definite to qualify as enforceable rights." Wright v. City of Roanoke Redev. &
Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 432 (1987). Although these laws provide a low-cost housing
initiative for the few who qualify, id. at 420, they do not grant a right to housing itself.
4. See infra notes 355-499 and accompanying text for a discussion of some of these
programs.
5. 74 N.Y.2d 92, 542 N.E.2d 1059, 544 N.Y.S.2d 542, cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 500 (1989).
6. Werner & Bryson, A Guide to the Preservation and Maintenance of Single Room
Occupancy (SRO) Housing (pts. I & II), 15 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 999, 1000 (1982). SRO's
provide more than an inexpensive room for the single working poor. They provide
management, security, independence, and society while being conveniently located to
community services. C. HOCH & R. SLAYTON, NEW HOMELESS AND OLD 155-62 (1989).
7. Werner & Bryson, supra note 6, at 1000.
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housekeeping.8 From 1970 to 1982, abandonment and gentrification9
wiped out, by some estimates, 1,116,000 SRO's, over half of the
nation's stock. 10 From 1974 to 1989, New York City alone lost over
100,000 units. I" By and large, the City's loss resulted from its previ-
ous policy that encouraged the destruction of SRO's in the belief that
they were substandard housing. 2 The City's J-51 tax abatement,
along with rising property values, gave developers an incentive to ren-
ovate or demolish SRO's. 3 However, by limiting tenant eviction,
rent control laws made it difficult to capture the tax abatement.14
Consequently, in anticipation of later development, many owners ille-
gally coerced tenants to move and then let the units stand vacant.' 5
As a result, the number of SRO's available for rental rapidly
decreased while homelessness increased.
Beginning in 1982, the City changed its policy in order to "fore-
8. Id.
9. Gentrification describes the process whereby rundown, but often occupied
neighborhoods, are "reclaimed" for residential use by high-income owners/tenants. Low-
income residents are displaced while land values in the surrounding areas rise, causing a
further spread of the phenomenon. Hopper, Susser & Conover, Economies of Makeshift:
Deindustrialization and Homelessness in New York City, 14 URB. ANTHROPOLOGY 11, 12
(1985). See generally Marcuse, Gentrification, Abandonment, and Displacement: Connections,
Causes, and Policy Responses in New York City, 28 WASH. U.J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 195
(1985) (noting that gentrification displaces low-income individuals and increases pressures on
housing and rents); Comment, Displacement in Gentrifying Neighborhoods: Regulating
Condominium Conversion Through Municipal Land Use Controls, 63 B.U.L. REV. 955 (1983)
(explaining that gentrification displaces tenants who can no longer afford to live in newly
refurbished neighborhoods).
10. Hopper & Hamberg, The Making of America's Homeless: From Skid Row to New
Poor, 1945-1984, in CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON HOUSING 23 (R. Bratt, C. Hartman & A.
Meyerson eds. 1986).
11. Brief of Defendants-Intervenors-Appellees at 1, Seawall Assocs. v. City of New York,
74 N.Y.2d 92, 542 N.E.2d 1059, 544 N.Y.S.2d 542 (No. 20891/86), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 500
(1989) [hereinafter Intervenor's Brief].
12. Municipal Respondents' Brief at 3, Seawall (No. 20891/86) [hereinafter Municipal
Respondents' Brief]. SRO's are still considered substandard housing, but City policy has
changed to recognize that substandard housing is better than sleeping on the streets. Id.
13. NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § J51-2.5 (1979) (Local Laws No. 77) (repealed
1983) provided a tax exemption for the renovation of SRO's. See Replan Dev. v. Department
of Hous. Preservation & Dev., 70 N.Y.2d 451, 454, 517 N.E.2d 200, 201, 522 N.Y.S.2d 485,
486 (1987), appeal dismissed, 485 U.S. 950 (1988).
14. "[U]nder rent control and rent stabilization laws, the vacating of dwelling units by
their occupants occurs usually by death, changed circumstances causing a willingness to move,
or through a negotiated buy-out for significant consideration." Brief of Plaintiff-Appellants
Seawall Associates at 52, Seawall (No. 20891/86) [hereinafter Seawall Brief]. Landlords
seeking the tax benefits or profits that would accrue from replacing SRO's with other housing
often used coercive tactics to pressure tenants to leave. Municipal Respondents' Brief, supra
note 12, at 4.
15. Municipal Respondents' Brief, supra note 12, at 4.
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stall the loss of SRO's"'16 and address tenant harassment problems."'
It repealed the J-51 tax abatement"8 and passed anti-eviction 9 and
anti-harassment laws.20 Still, the number of SRO's continued to
decline.2 In 1985, the City declared that the loss of SRO's consti-
tuted a "serious public emergency" and placed an eighteen-month
moratorium on their demolition or conversion to allow time to study
the housing crisis.22 City studies reflected a correlation between the
loss of SRO's and an increase in homelessness. 23 In 1987, realizing
that only 52,000 SRO's remained,24 the City passed Local Law No.
9.25
Local Law No. 9 extended the moratorium on the demolition
16. Id. at 4-5 (quoting Replan, 70 N.Y.2d at 457, 517 N.E.2d at 203, 522 N.Y.S.2d at 488).
17. Id.
18. Replan, 70 N.Y.2d at 454, 517 N.E.2d at 201, 522 N.Y.S.2d at 486. The J-51 tax
abatement was repealed on June 30, 1983, retroactive to June 1, 1982. Id.
19. NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 26-521 (1982) (Local Laws No. 56) imposed
criminal sanctions for unlawful evictions. Local Law No. 56 also provided funding for a
special housing unit to prosecute illegal harassment of SRO tenants. See Intervenor's Brief,
supra note 11, at 7.
20. NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 27-198 (1983) (Local Laws No. 19) conditions
permits to demolish or convert SRO's on certification of no harassment for the previous three
years. See Municipal Respondents' Brief, supra note 12, at 5. Otherwise, no permit may be
issued for three years. Id.
21. Municipal Respondents' Brief, supra note 12, at 5.
22. In enacting Local Law 59, the City Council declared that the loss of SRO's constituted
a serious public emergency:
The Council hereby finds and declares that a serious public emergency exists...
caused by the loss of single room occupancy dwelling units housing lower income
persons;... that many of such occupants are elderly and infirm persons of low
income who are incapable of finding alternative housing accommodations; that a
considerable number of such persons have become part of a growing homeless
population; that the intervention of the city government is necessary to protect
such housing stock by imposing a moratorium on conversions, alterations and
demolitions of single room occupancy multiple dwellings; that during such
moratorium the department of housing preservation and development ... shall
arrange for the preparation of a study to determine the best means of making
available single room occupancy dwelling units and other housing for low income
persons ....
New York, N.Y., Local Laws No. 59, § 1 (1985); Municipal Respondents' Brief, supra note 12,
at 6.
23. Municipal Respondents' Brief, supra note 12, at 6 (citing Blackburn, Single Room
Occupancy in New York City (Feb. 1986) (study conducted for and available from Urban
Systems Research & Engineering, New York, New York). This phenomenon also has been
documented in other cities. See Huttman, Homelessness as a Housing Problem in an Inner City
in the US., in AFFORDABLE HOUSING AND THE HOMELESS 159 (J. Friedrichs ed. 1988).
24. Brief for Appellants 459 West 43rd Street Corp. at 30, Seawall Assocs. v. City of New
York, 74 N.Y.2d 92, 542 N.E.2d 1059, 544 N.Y.S.2d 542 (No. 20891/86), cert. denied, 110 S.
Ct. 500 (1989) [hereinafter 459 West Briefi.
25. Municipal Respondents' Brief, supra note 12, at 8.
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and conversion of SRO's for an additional five years.26 Further, it
imposed obligations on SRO owners to rehabilitate and make every
SRO in their building habitable, and to rent the units at rent-con-
trolled rates ("rent-up" or "anti-warehousing" provision). 27  The
City tried to strike a balance between the competing interests of the
poor and the private property owners by including three escape mech-
26. Initially, Local Law No. 22 of 1986 extended the moratorium through the end of 1986.
Seawall, 74 N.Y.2d at 99-100, 542 N.E.2d at 1061, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 544. Local Law No. 22
also imposed affirmative rental and rehabilitation obligations on SRO owners along with
monetary penalties for noncompliance. Id. On a constitutional challenge, Local Law No. 22
was declared invalid under the due process clause. Seawall Assocs. v. City of New York, 134
Misc. 2d 187, 510 N.Y.S.2d 435 (Sup. Ct. 1986), later proceeding, 138 Misc. 2d 96, 523
N.Y.S.2d 353 (Sup. Ct. 1987) (invalidating Local Law No. 9, which replaced Local Law No.
22), rev'd, 142 A.D.2d 72, 534 N.Y.S.2d 958 (App. Div. 1988), rev'd, 74 N.Y.2d 92, 542
N.E.2d 1059, 544 N.Y.S.2d 542, cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 500 (1989). The court held that in
requiring the creation of tenancies, "Local Law No. 22 places petitioners in a business, forces
them to remain in that business and refuses to allow them to ever cease doing business ....
These regulations impose an unreasonable and arbitrary scheme and frustrate plaintiff's
property rights without due process of law." Id. at 197, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 443. Without
perfecting an appeal, the City passed Local Law No. 9. Seawall, 74 N.Y.2d at 100, 542 N.E.2d
at 1061, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 544. Under Local Law No. 9, owners could not convert, demolish, or
alter SRO's for five years. New York, N.Y., Local Laws No. 9, § 7 (Nov. 5, 1987). The City
moratorium could renew for additional five-year periods if the City found that the serious
public emergency continued to exist. Id
27. Subdivision 27-2151[a] was referred to as the "rent-up" or "anti-warehousing"
provision. It provided:
[A]n owner of a single room occupancy multiple dwelling.., shall have a duty
(1) to make habitable and maintain in a habitable condition all single room
occupancy dwelling units and (2) to rent such habitable single room occupancy
dwelling units to bona fide tenants ... at rents no greater than the rent
authorized by law.
NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 27-2151[a] (1987).
In addition, as an inducement to comply with subdivision 27-2151[a], subdivisions 27-
2152[d] and [e] provided:
d. For purposes of this section there shall be a rebuttable presumption that
an owner has violated the provisions of subdivision a of section 27-2151 if a single
room occupancy dwelling unit is not occupied by a bona fide tenant for a period
of thirty days or longer.
e. 1. An owner who violates the provisions of subdivision a of section 27-
2151 shall be subject to a civil penalty of five hundred dollars for each single
room occupancy dwelling unit cited in the notice and order issued pursuant to
subdivision a of this section. In addition, an owner who fails to comply with the
order within the time specified in the order ... shall be subject to a civil penalty
of two hundred fifty dollars per day for each dwelling unit to be calculated from
a date ten days after service of the order to the date of compliance therewith.
Id § 27-2152[d]-[e][l].
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anisms in Local Law No. 9: the buy-out,2" the replacement, 29 and the
hardship 30 provisions. The buy-out provision allowed owners to seek
exemption from the law by paying $45,000 per unit to a housing
fund.3' The replacement provision allowed owners to replace SRO's
with dwelling units affordable to persons of low and moderate income
prior to issuance of a building permit.32 The hardship provision
exempted owners who could prove that they could not earn a "rea-
sonable rate of return ' 33 from the rental of SRO units. Local Law
No. 9 defined "reasonable rate of return" as eight and one-half per-
28. Id. § 27.198.2[d][4][a][i]. Under the buy-out provision, the conversion, alteration, and
demolition prohibitions did not apply if:
Prior to issuance of a permit for work which would otherwise by [sic] prohibited
[hereunder,] the owner of such single room occupancy multiple dwelling ...
provide[d] for the replacement of the single room occupancy dwelling units
which would be altered, converted or demolished by paying to the single room
occupancy housing development fund company.., for each dwelling unit which
would be altered, converted or demolished as a result of the work, forty-five
thousand dollars or such other amount which the commissioner of housing
preservation and development determines by regulation would equal the cost of
creating a dwelling unit, other than an apartment, to replace such single room
occupancy dwelling unit.
Id.
29. Id. § 27.198.2[d][4][a][ii]. Under the replacement provision, the conversion,
alteration, and demolition prohibitions did not apply if:
Prior to issuance of a permit for work which would otherwise be prohibited
[hereunder,] ... the owner replace[d] the single room occupancy dwelling units
which would be altered, converted or demolished as a result of such work
elsewhere within the city by providing dwelling units affordable to persons of low
and moderate income .... .Replacement" shall include but not be limited to the
acquisition of an existing multiple dwelling or the creation of such dwelling units
either by the construction of a new multiple dwelling or the substantial
rehabilitation of an existing multiple dwelling. "Multiple dwelling" shall include
but not be limited to a "single room occupancy multiple dwelling."
Id.
30. Id. § 27-198.2[d][4][b][i]. The hardship provision provided as follows:
The amount of the payment required to be made or the number of dwelling units
required to be provided [under the buy-out or replacement provisions] .. .may
be reduced in whole or in part by the commissioner of housing preservation and
development if such commissioner determines that the owner has established:
(i) that there is no reasonable possibility that such owner can make a
reasonable rate of return unless the property is altered or converted in a manner
prohibited [hereunder] .. .or demolished ....
Id.
31. Id. § 27.198.2[d][4][a][i]. If 50% or more of the units were occupied as of January 20,
1987, however, the owner could not use the buy out provision and had to provide replacement
units instead. Id.
32. Id. § 27.198.2[d][4][a][ii]. The law allowed owners to replace units either by new
construction or by substantial rehabilitation of existing buildings. Id. Replacement units were
not limited to SRO's. Id.
33. Id. § 27-198.2[d][4][b][i].
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cent of the assessed value of the property as an SRO.34
Seawall Associates and other owners of buildings containing
SRO's (collectively "Seawall") sought an injunction and declaration
that Local Law No. 9 was an unconstitutional taking of their proper-
ties.3" The trial court held that the anti-warehousing provisions were
unconstitutional and that the buy-out, replacement, and hardship
provisions enlarged the constitutional infirmities because they were
"tantamount to extortion. '36
The City appealed and the appellate division unanimously
reversed, holding that Local Law No. 9 was "intended to accomplish
the legitimate governmental goal of preventing homelessness ... and
[did] not deny the plaintiffs the opportunity to earn a reasonable rate
of return on their property." 37 The Court of Appeals of New York
reversed, holding Local Law No. 9 facially invalid both as a physical
taking, because it interfered with an owner's rights to possess and to
exclude others, 38 and as a regulatory taking, because the moratorium
and anti-warehousing provisions required property owners to put
their properties to public use without compensation.39
In analyzing the issues raised in Seawall, Section II of this Com-
ment sets forth an historical perspective of the takings jurisprudence,
by both defining and differentiating between physical and regulatory
takings. Section III discusses Seawall's holding and reasoning. Sec-
tion IV analyzes Seawall and argues that the New York Court of
Appeals unreasonably has extended both the physical and regulatory
takings doctrines and has jeopardized the City's ability to provide
access to affordable housing for the poor by striking Local Law No. 9
on a facial challenge. Section V describes innovative housing pro-
grams in other municipalities, predicting that many of the programs
would be invalid under Seawall's analysis. Section VI concludes that
in order to preserve housing for the poor, courts should reject Sea-
wall's reasoning and overcome the impulse to invalidate innovative
34. Id. § 27-198.2[d][4][b][iii]. The assessed value generally represents 45% of the
property's fair market value. Seawall Assocs. v. City of New York, 74 N.Y.2d 92, 114 n.13,
542 N.E.2d 1059, 1070 n.13, 544 N.Y.S.2d 542, 553 n.13, cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 500 (1989).
35. Seawall, 138 Misc. 2d 96, 523 N.Y.S.2d 353 (Sup. Ct. 1987), rev'd, 142 A.D.2d 72, 534
N.Y.S.2d 958 (App. Div. 1988), rev'd, 74 N.Y.2d 92, 542 N.E.2d 1059, 544 N.Y.S.2d 542, cert.
denied, 110 S. Ct. 500 (1989).
36. Id. at 108, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 361.
37. Seawall, 142 A.D.2d 72, 87, 534 N.Y.S.2d 958, 968 (App. Div. 1988) (citation
omitted), rev'g, 138 Misc. 2d 96, 523 N.Y.S.2d 353 (Sup. Ct. 1987), rev'd, 74 N.Y.2d 92, 542
N.E.2d 1059, 544 N.Y.S.2d 542, cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 500 (1989).
38. Seawall, 74 N.Y.2d 92, 106, 542 N.E.2d 1059, 1065, 544 N.Y.S.2d 542, 548, cert.
denied, 110 S. Ct. 500 (1989).
39. Id. at 115, 542 N.E.2d at 1070-71, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 553-54.
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programs on facial challenges. Finally, the Appendix in Section VII
sets forth a checklist for drafting creative programs that have a
greater likelihood of surviving constitutional challenges.
II. HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE TAKINGS CLAUSE
The fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Con-
stitution4° limit the government's ability to interfere with private
property interests. The fifth amendment provides that "private prop-
erty [shall not] be taken for public use, without just compensation."4
The United States Supreme Court repeatedly has *observed that the
fifth amendment's purpose is to "bar Government from forcing some
people alone to bear burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should
be borne by the public as a whole."42 The fifth amendment is made
applicable to the states by the fourteenth amendment to the United
States Constitution.43
Takings cases can be divided into two lines of authority: perma-
nent physical occupation cases (also called per se takings) and regula-
tory takings cases. 44 A physical taking occurs when the government
causes a permanent physical occupation upon private property, either
directly or by authorizing others to do so. 45  If the Court finds that
the government's action causes a permanent physical occupation, it
"uniformly ha[s] found a taking to the extent of the occupation, with-
out regard to whether the action achieves an important public benefit
40. The Seawall court rested its holding on both the fifth amendment of the United States
Constitution and article I, section 7, of the New York State Constitution. Id. at 115-16, 542
N.E.2d at 1071, 554 N.Y.S.2d at 554. However, the court's takings analysis rested almost
exclusively on the United States Constitution. The court noted that "[i]n view of this holding,
we need not decide the extent to which, if at all, the protections of the 'Takings Clause' of the
New York State Constitution differ from those under the Federal Constitution." Id. at 116
n.15, 542 N.E.2d at 1071 n.15, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 554 n.15. This Comment is limited to the
takings clause of the United States Constitution.
41. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
42. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304,
318-19 (1987) (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)); Agins v. Tiburon,
447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 260
(1978).
43. See Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 235-41 (1897).
44. Note, Rethinking the Physical Takings Test: An Expanded Notion of Property Rights-
Seawall Associates v. City of New York, 5 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENTARY 103, 105-06
(1989).
45. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982). For a
discussion of Loretto, see infra notes 57-82 and accompanying text. See also Michelman,
Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation"
Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1184 (1967) ("The modern significance of physical occupation is
that courts, while they sometimes do hold nontrespassory injuries compensable, never deny
compensation for a physical takeover.").
[Vol. 45:467
STONEWALLED BY SEAWALL
or has only minimal economic impact on the owner,"'  and compen-
sation is required.4 7
A regulatory taking, on the other hand, typically involves a gov-
ernmental interference so excessive that it deprives the owner of all
beneficial or economic use of the property, placing the burden of a
public benefit disproportionately on one or a few property owners.4"
Regulatory taking cases may involve temporary physical invasions of
private property.49 To determine whether the regulation causes a tak-
ing for which compensation would be required, the Court engages in
"an ad hoc inquiry in which several factors are particularly signifi-
cant-the economic impact of the regulation, the extent to which it
interferes with investment-backed expectations, and the character of
the government action."'  If, on balance, the Court determines that
the regulation alleviates a public harm, or "adjust[s] the benefits and
burdens of economic life to promote the common good,""1 while
allowing the owner to retain reasonable beneficial use, it has tended to
hold that the regulation in question is not a taking, and therefore, that
the property owner is not entitled to any compensation for loss. 2
Thus, it is only when the regulation is seen as going "too far" that it
will be considered a taking.5 3  Subsection A discusses permanent
physical occupation cases and Subsection B discusses regulatory tak-
ings cases.
46. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 434-35.
47. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304,
315 (1987).
The basic understanding of the [Fifth] Amendment makes clear that it is
designed not to limit the governmental interference with property rights per se,
but rather to secure compensation in the event of otherwise proper interference
amounting to a taking. Thus, governmental action that works a taking of
property rights necessarily implicates the "constitutional obligation to pay just
compensation."
Id. (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
48. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). See infra Section II(B) for a
discussion of the regulatory takings jurisprudence.
49. See Loretto, 458 U.S. at 426-35 (distinguishing between permanent physical
occupations of property, which always constitute a taking, and temporary physical invasions,
which are subject to the Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978),
balancing test).
50. Id. at 432 (citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124
(1978)).
51. Id at 426 (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124
(1978)).
52. Id.
53. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
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A. Permanent Physical Occupations
Whether a court classifies a physical invasion as permanent or
temporary substantially affects its analysis.5 4 If a court categorizes an
activity of the government as a "permanent physical occupation," it
will find a per se taking and require compensation without regard to
the legitimacy of the state interests involved or the economic impact
of the regulation." If a court deems an activity to be a "temporary
physical invasion," however, the activity does not rise to the level of a
per se taking and is subjected to a balancing test discussed in Subsec-
tion B below.5 6
The United States Supreme Court clarified the distinction
between permanent physical occupations and temporary physical
invasions in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CA TV Corp.57
Loretto addressed a New York law that required landlords to permit
cable companies to place connection facilities on their buildings to
facilitate tenant access to cable television.5" Regulations entitled the
landlord to a one-time, one dollar connection fee59 which was sub-
stantially less than the fee landlords previously received from Tele-
prompter.' Relying on the law, Teleprompter installed cables on
Loretto's property.6' The installation deprived Loretto of a total of
one-eighth of a cubic foot of space on the roof of her building.62
Loretto sued, claiming that the law permitting Teleprompter's actions
constituted a taking without just compensation.6 a
The New York Court of Appeals upheld the law, finding that it
served a legitimate public purpose of "rapid development of and max-
imum penetration by a means of communication which ha[d] impor-
tant education and community aspects." 64  The United States
Supreme Court reversed, holding that a permanent physical occupa-
tion authorized by the government is a taking without regard to the
public interests that it may serve. In so holding, the Court carefully
54. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 428-35.
55. Id. at 434-35.
56. See infra Section II(B).
57. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
58. Id. at 421, 423 (discussing N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 828(1) (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982)).
59. Id. at 423.
60. Teleprompter previously paid landlords five percent of the gross revenues that it
realized from the particular property. Id.
61. Id. at 421.
62. Id. at 443.
63. Id. at 424.
64. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 53 N.Y.2d 124, 143-44, 440
N.Y.S.2d 843, 852, 423 N.E.2d 320, 329 (1981).
. 65. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 426.
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distinguished permanent physical invasions from temporary inva-
sions.66 Beginning with permanent physical invasions, the Court
explained, "'Where real estate is actually invaded by superinduced
additions of water, earth, sand or other material, or by having any
artificial structure placed on it, so as to effectually destroy or impair
its usefulness, it is a taking .... ' 67 The logic of this characterization
relies upon the Court's definition of property rights as rights of use,
possession, and disposition.6" To the extent that the government
causes a permanent physical invasion, "it effectively destroys each of
these rights."6 9 The owner is forever deprived of the power to control
the use of the property, resulting in a per se taking.70
The Court noted that, on the other hand, a temporary physical
invasion or a regulation that merely restricts the use of property is not
a per se taking.71 For example, in PruneYard Shopping Center v. Rob-
ins,72 the Court upheld a state constitutional requirement that
handbillers be allowed to exercise free speech and petition on shop-
ping center property even though the action constituted a physical
invasion. 73 "Since the invasion was temporary and limited in nature,
and since the owner had not exhibited an interest in excluding all
persons from his property, 'the fact that [the solicitors] may have
"physically invaded" [the owners'] property cannot be viewed as
66. Id. at 428-35.
67. Id. at 427 (quoting Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166, 181 (1871)); cf
United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946) (frequent flights immediately above a
landowner's property constituted a taking); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co.,
195 U.S. 540 (1904) (taking found when telegraph company constructed and operated
telegraph lines over railroad's property); United States v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 445 (1902)
(permanent flooding of property constituted a taking); St. Louis v. Western Union Tel. Co.,
148 U.S. 92, 98-99 (1893) (taking found when telegraph company placed telegraph poles on
the city's public streets).
68. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 435.
69. Id. The owner has no right to possess the space himself and no power to exclude the
occupier from possession and use. Id. Even though he may retain the bare legal right to
dispose of the property, "the permanent occupation of that space by a stranger will ordinarily
empty the right of any value, since the purchaser will also be unable to make any use of the
property." Id. at 436.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 428-34. The Loretto Court characterized United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256
(1946), as a per se taking although the case was decided as a physical invasion case not rising
to the level of a per se taking. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 430. In Causby, frequent, low-flying airline
flights over the claimant's property constituted a physical invasion because it interfered with
state-acknowledged property rights (air space), and destroyed its beneficial use. Causby, 328
U.S. at 266. The Court did not find a per se taking, however, because the record did not
establish whether the invasion was permanent. Id. at 268. Apparently, Loretto has re-
characterized the case as finding a per se taking.
72. 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
73. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 434 (citing PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 84).
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determinative.' , Similarly, in Kaiser Aetna v. United States,75 the
Court held that the government's attempt to create a public right of
access into a private marina was unconstitutional. 76 Because the inva-
sion was not permanent, 77 however, the Court's decision did not rest
on physical invasion grounds alone.78 Rather, the Kaiser Aetna Court
emphasized that the physical invasion would frustrate the owner's
investment-back expectations by causing a substantial devaluation of
the property, thus resulting in a taking.79
After making the distinction between permanent and temporary
invasions, the Loretto Court concluded that the cable statute worked a
per se taking80 insofar as it authorized a permanent physical occupa-
tion of cable wires and boxes on Loretto's property, rather than sim-
ply a temporary invasion or regulation of use.8' The size of the
intrusion was relevant only to determine the amount of compensation
due.8 2
More recently, in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 3 the
74. Id. (quoting Prune Yard, 447 U.S. at 84).
75. 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
76. Id. at 180.
77. When discussing Kaiser Aetna, the Loretto Court noted that "[a]lthough the easement
of passage, not being a permanent occupation of land, was not considered a taking per se,
Kaiser Aetna reemphasizes that a physical invasion is a government intrusion of an unusually
serious character." Loretto, 458 U.S. at 433.
78. Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 179-80.
79. Id. at 180.
80. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 438.
81. Id. at 441.
82. Id. at 437. In a footnote, the Court indicated the limits of its narrow holding. "If [the
statute] required landlords to provide cable installation if a tenant so desires, the statute might
present a different question... since the landlord would own the installation." Id. at 440 n. 19
(emphasis added). The Court noted that:
Ownership [of the installation] would give the landlord rights to the placement,
manner, use, and possibly the disposition of the installation.... The landlord
would decide how to comply with applicable government regulations concerning
CATV and therefore could minimize the physical, aesthetic, and other effects of
the installation. Moreover, if the landlord wished to repair, demolish, or
construct in the areas of the building where the installation is located, he need
not incur the burden of obtaining the CATV company's cooperation in moving
the cable.
Id. Thus, no per se taking occurs when an ordinance requires the owner of property to comply
with its terms rather than requiring the government or a third party to enter onto property to
bring it into compliance.
In Seawall, the City relied on this language to refute Seawall's argument that the anti-
warehousing provision of Local Law No. 9 authorized a permanent physical occupation of its
property. Municipal Respondents' Brief, supra note 12, at 24. "The anti-warehousing provi-
sion is similar to the law hypothesized by the Supreme Court in Loretto. The plaintiffs must
rent out their SRO units but they retain the owners' right to decide which applicants to rent
their rooms to. Thus, there is no physical taking." Id at 58 (citation omitted).
83. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
[V/ol. 45:467
1990-1991] STONEWALLED BY SEAWALL
Court added another element to the per se takings analysis. It said
that a permanent physical occupation would not cause a per se taking
if the invasion was a result of a lawful condition attached to a devel-
opment permit."4 For example, if the government had the power to
forbid construction of a project for a legitimate governmental pur-
pose, "condition[ing] construction upon some concession by the
owner, even a concession of property rights" would not constitute a
per se taking.s5 The Court explained that "if a prohibition designed
to accomplish that purpose would be a legitimate exercise of the
police power rather than a taking, it would be strange to conclude
that providing the owner an alternative to that prohibition which
accomplishes the same purpose is not."8 6 Accordingly, if the govern-
ment has the power to restrict use of property, allowing the owner to
overcome that restriction, even by requiring a permanent physical
occupation, does not result in a per se taking. 7 To determine the
validity of the regulation, the Court asks whether the government has
the power to restrict use of property (i.e., whether its purpose is
"legitimate") and if so, whether the legislation seems designed to
achieve that purpose without depriving the owner of economically
viable use of his property." This test was introduced in Nollan and is
elaborated below in connection with the Court's regulatory takings
84. I. at 836.
85. Id. In Nollan, petitioners rented a beach bungalow with an option to buy conditioned
upon their promise to demolish and replace it. Id. at 827-28. The state conditioned the
building permit upon the Nollans' granting the public the right to pass across the beach
portion of their property. Id at 828.
86. Id at 836-37.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 834. The Nollan Court noted that:
We have long recognized that land-use regulation does not effect a taking if it
"substantially advance[s] legitimate state interests" and does not "den[y] an
owner economically viable use of his land." Our cases have not elaborated on the
standards for determining what constitutes a "legitimate state interest" or what
type of connection between the regulation and the state interest satisfies the
requirement that the former "substantially advance" the latter. They have made
clear, however, that a broad range of governmental purposes and regulations
satisfies these requirements. The Commission argues that among these
permissible purposes are protecting the public's ability to see the beach, assisting
the public in overcoming the "psychological barrier" to using the beach created
by a developed shorefront, and preventing congestion on the public beaches. We
assume, without deciding that this is so-in which case the Commission
unquestionably would be able to deny the Nollans their [building] permit
outright if their new house (alone or by reason of the cumulative impact
produced in conjunction with other construction) would substantially impede
these purposes, unless the denial would interfere so drastically with the Nollans'
use of their property as to constitute a taking.
Id at 834-36 (footnotes and citations omitted).
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tests which the Court uses when the governmental interference causes
either a temporary physical invasion or a regulation on use.
B. Regulatory Takings89
The Court has identified several factors that it weighs on an "ad
hoc" basis when determining whether a regulation causes a regulatory
taking. This Subsection first discusses Penn Central Transportation
Co. v. City of New York, which sets forth the factors that the Court
weights.9° Next, it examines changes in the Penn Central test as
applied to conditional land use regulations in connection with Nollan
v. California Coastal Commission.91 Finally, this Subsection addresses
the Court's flirtation with the unbundling of property rights, termed
"conceptual severance" by Professor Margaret Jane Radin.92
1. THE PENN CENTRAL FACTORS
In 1978, the Court admitted that in the takings area it essentially
engages in "ad hoc, factual inquiries," and identified several factors
that it considers when determining whether public action causes a
regulatory taking.9a As explained in Penn Central Transportation Co.
v. City of New York,94 the Court first analyzes the character of the
governmental action, and then engages in a five-factor economic
impact analysis.9" These five factors include an analysis of (1) the
economic impact of the regulation; (2) a determination whether the
regulation represents a public burden that should more appropriately
be shared by all, rather than shouldered by a few; (3) the reciprocity
of advantage; (4) the extent to which the regulation has interfered
with investment-backed expectations; and (5) the ability of the prop-
erty owner to earn a reasonable rate of return.96 The Penn Central
case illustrates how the Court applies its factors.
In 1965, New York City adopted its Landmark Preservation
89. Commentators have characterized the regulatory takings jurisprudence as "the most
haunting jurisprudential problem in the field of contemporary land-use law[,]... one that may
be the lawyer's equivalent of the physicist's hunt for the quark." L. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 9-4, at 596 (2d ed. 1988) (quoting C. HAAR, LAND-USE PLANNING
766 (3d ed. 1976)).
90. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
91. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
92. See Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents in the Jurisprudence of
Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1667, 1676 (1988).
93. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
94. Id
95. Id. at 124.
96. Id at 124-38.
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Law.9 7 The law required owners of historic sites to preserve the exte-
rior of their buildings and to obtain approval before any structural
changes could be made.98 The owner's ability to transfer development
rights from one parcel to another partially alleviated these restric-
tions.9 9 Grand Central Terminal ("Terminal"), a 1913 beaux-art style
building, was one of four hundred structures that the city singled out
for landmark designation under this law.' °0 Because Penn Central
Transportation Co. ("Penn Central"), the owner of the Terminal, was
facing financial difficulties,10' it requested approval to construct a
fifty-three-story office tower on top of the Terminal to make the prop-
erty profitable."°2 When the city denied its building permit, Penn
Central challenged the constitutionality of the law. 0 3
In one of its most complete discussions of the takings clause,"°
the Court began by analyzing the character of the landmark law.
"[I]n instances in which a state tribunal reasonably conclude[s] that
'the health, safety, morals, or general welfare' would be promoted by
prohibiting particular contemplated uses of land, this Court has
upheld land-use regulations that destroyed or adversely affected rec-
ognized real property interests."'0 5 The Court confirmed that the
state might properly make a choice between preservation of one class
of property over another, depending on what it felt was of greater
value to the public.' °6 However, a use restriction is limited in that it
must be "reasonably necessary to the effectuation of a substantial pub-
lic purpose.""1 7 The Court found New York's Landmark Law met
this purpose because it embodied a comprehensive plan to preserve
structures of historic or aesthetic interest.'0 8
a. As-Applied Economic Analysis
Before turning to the economic impact of the law on Penn Cen-
tral, the Court first defined "property" for takings purposes and then
turned to the five individual factors. The Court explained that in
97. Id. at 108-09.
98. Id. at 111-12.
99. Id. at 113-14.
100. Id. at 111 n.12.
101. Id. at 141 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
102. Id. at 116-17.
103. Id. at 116-19.
104. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 432 (1982).
105. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 125 (quoting Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188
(1928)).
106. Id. at 126.
107. Id. at 127.
108. Id. at 132.
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defining property, it focuses on the entire parcel affected by the
restriction-"here, the city tax block designated as the 'landmark
site.' "109 Therefore, the fact that the Landmark Law restricted Penn
Central's ability to build above the Terminal did not cause a taking of
its air or development rights because those rights were simply a small
portion of the whole property."1 ° In addition, transferability of the
development rights offset any interference caused by the Landmark
Law."
Turning to the five economic impact factors, the Court first
looked at the reduction in value on the property as a whole and noted
that although the Law reduced Penn Central's property value,"I2 this
factor was not dispositive. Land-use regulations promoting the gen-
eral welfare have been upheld in the past even though they caused a
great diminution in property value." 3 Second, the Court determined
that the city had not singled out Penn Central to bear a public burden
because four hundred other buildings had been designated landmarks
as well." 1  Third, the Court found that Penn Central was benefiting
from the law because "preservation of landmarks benefits all New
York citizens and all structures, both economically and by improving
the quality of life in the city as a whole."' 5 Fourth, because the Ter-
minal had been continuously used in the same manner for sixty-five
years, the Court inferred that the law did not interfere with Penn Cen-
tral's primary expectations." 6 Finally, the Court determined that
Penn Central could earn a "reasonable" rate of return because Penn
Central had not argued that it could not.1 7 In sum, the Court upheld
109. L at 131. The significance of this statement will be explored further in the conceptual
severance section discussed below. See infra notes 150-217 and accompanying text.
110. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 131.
111. Id. at 137-38.
112. Penn Central would lose three million dollars in yearly revenues. Id. at 116.
113. See Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (75% diminution in value
caused by zoning law not a taking); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (87.5%
diminution in value caused by restriction on brickmaking not a taking).
114. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 132.
115. Id. at 134-35.
116. Id at 136.
117. Id. at 129. The Court did not explain whether "reasonable rate of return" was to be
computed with regard to a percentage of the fair market value of the property, or to the
assessed value of the property. Lower court cases have calculated it using the owner's
investment in the property, plus taxes, expenses, improvements, and other carrying charges.
See, e.g., Northern Westchester Prof. Park v. Town of Bedford, 60 N.Y.2d 492, 458 N.E.2d
809, 470 N.Y.S.2d 350 (1983). The claimant must prove that the purchase price did not
include a premium over fair market value at the time of the purchase in anticipation of a
change in zoning. Id. at 503, 458 N.E.2d at 814-15, 470 N.Y.S.2d at 356. Calculation of




the landmark law because it found, under the foregoing analysis, that
the law was substantially related to the promotion of the general wel-
fare from which Penn Central also would benefit and that Penn Cen-
tral could continue profitably to use its property.' 18
b. Facial Attacks
In other cases, the Court has stressed that the Penn Central" 'ad
hoc, factual inquiries' must be conducted with respect to specific
property, and the particular estimates of economic impact and ulti-
mate valuation relevant in the unique circumstances."' 19 Otherwise,
if there is no "concrete controversy concerning application of the
[law] ...on specific parcels of land,"'12 the Court is faced with a
"facial attack." 21 "A facial challenge is an argument that concludes
that the law at issue is a taking in all its applications, as to every
property within the law's ambit.'" 22 Although it repeatedly has
observed that facial challenges are disfavored,1 23 the Court neverthe-
less has entertained them-albeit to a limited extent. 124 When it does,
the Court looks at the uses that can be made of the property in light of
the restriction to determine whether the "mere enactment" of the law
"denies an owner economically viable use of his land."125 Because it
is virtually impossible to establish in the record that the challenged
regulation has precluded all viable uses, the Court has warned that
the claimant "faces an uphill battle"1 26 in making a facial attack.
Thus, in Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis,1 27 for
example, the Court rejected a facial attack on the Pennsylvania Bitu-
minous Mine Subsidence and Land Conservation Act 128 even though
it deprived the owners of millions of dollars in coal because the own-
ers failed to show that the Act "ma[d]e it commercially impracticable
118. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 138.
119. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 295 (1981); see
also Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 495-96 (1987); Agins v.
City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).
120. Virginia Surface Mining, 452 U.S. at 295.
121. Facial challenges present no concrete controversy concerning the application of the
law on specific property interests. Id. at 295-96.
122. Seawall Assocs. v. City of New York, 74 N.Y.2d 92, 122, 542 N.E.2d 1059, 1075, 544
N.Y.S.2d 542, 557-58 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 500 (1989).
123. In Keystone, the Court admonished against facial challenges to statutes raising
allegations of an unconstitutional taking of private property. 480 U.S. at 494 (citing Virginia




127. 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
128. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 1406.4 (Purdon Supp. 1990).
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for them to continue mining their bituminous coal interests in western
Pennsylvania."' 129
2. THE NOLLAN TEST
In the 1987 Nollan v. California Coastal Commission130 case, the
Court, while reaffirming Penn Central, changed its emphasis on the
level of scrutiny to be given to land-use regulations and reformulated
the test. 13' Now, in analyzing whether land use regulations constitute
a taking, the Court asks two questions: (1) whether the regulation
substantially advances a legitimate state interest; 132 and (2) whether it
deprives the owner of economically viable use of his land.1 33 The
Court will invalidate the restriction if it fails either test.
In Nollan, the claimants leased beachfront property with an
option to buy conditioned upon their demolishing and replacing a
pre-existing bungalow.' 34 The Nollans applied for a building permit
to the California Coastal Commission ("Commission"). The Com-
mission informed the Nollans that it would condition permit approval
on their granting the public an easement to walk across the beach area
of their property.13 The Nollans refused to grant the easement and
sued.' 36 In dicta, the Court mentioned that an outright easement
requirement not conditioned on a building permit would constitute a
per se taking.137 The Court explained, however, that if the Commis-
sion had the power to deny a building permit for a legitimate state
purpose, then conditioning the Nollans' permit on their granting an
easement to achieve that same end would not be a per se taking.1 38 In
determining whether the regulation was valid, the Court turned to the
first prong of its test and asked whether the regulation substantially
129. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 495-96; cf Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation
Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 296 (1981) (upholding a similar mining act, noting that "the Act does not,
on its face, prevent beneficial use of coal-bearing lands"); Peterson, Land Use Regulatory
"Takings Revisited" The New Supreme Court Approaches, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 335, 343-44
(1988) (discussing generally the problem of facial attacks).
130. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
131. Id. at 834 (explaining that a "land-use regulation does not effect a taking if it
'substantially advance[s] legitimate state interests' and does not 'den[y] an owner economically
viable use of his land' " (emphasis added)). Prior to Nollan, the Court, for more than 25 years,
had used the more deferential rational relationship test to assess the constitutionality of a
state's exercise of its police power. Id. at 843 n. 1 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
132. Id. at 834.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 827-28.
135. Forty-three out of sixty other coastal development permits had been similarly
conditioned. Id. at 829.
136. Id. at 828-29.
137. Id. at 831.
138. Id. at 836-37.
[Vol. 45:467
STONEWALLED BY SEAWALL
advanced a legitimate state purpose. 139  The Court noted that "a
broad range of governmental purposes and regulations" have consti-
tuted "legitimate state interest[s]." 11 It assumed, without analysis,
that the purposes of the regulation-protecting the public's ability to
see the beach, preventing congestion on the public beaches, and over-
coming the public's "psychological barrier" in using the beach-were
legitimate.'41 It then confirmed that the Commission would be able to
deny the Nollans a building permit outright if the Nollans' new home
substantially impeded those purposes. 4 2 The Court found, however,
that conditioning the permit on an easement to pass back and forth
along the beach did not serve that stated end.1 43  "It [was] quite
impossible to understand how a requirement [allowing] people
already on the public beaches.., to walk across the Nollans' property
reduce[d] any obstacles to viewing the beach created by the new
house." 44 Because the condition failed the first prong of the test, the
Court found a taking without engaging in an economic analysis using
the Penn Central factors.14
5
Consequently, the change that Nollan introduced into takings
jurisprudence is the requirement of a tighter fit between the ends and
means of land use regulations.' 46 It is unclear, however, just how
139. Id at 835.
140. Id. at 834-35 (citing Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260-62 (1980) (scenic zoning);
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (landmark preservation);
and Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (residential zoning)).
141. Id. at 835. One commentator finds this assumption an inherent weakness in the
Court's analysis. The "Court applied an intermediate level of scrutiny to the means the
government implemented to achieve its goals and little or no scrutiny to the legitimacy of the
government's objective." Comment, The Supreme Court's Trilogy of Regulatory Takings:
Keystone, Glendale and Nollan, 38 DE PAUL L. REv. 441, 481 (1989).
142. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 835. "If a prohibition designed to accomplish that purpose would
be a legitimate exercise of the police power rather than a taking, it would be strange to
conclude that providing the owner an alternative to that prohibition which accomplishes the
same purpose is not." Id. at 836-37.
143. Id. The Court gave a few examples of conditions that would serve the same purpose:
height limitations, width restrictions, a ban on fences, or requiring the Nollans to provide a
viewing spot on their property. All of these would have advanced the state's goal of providing
a view of the beach to the public. Id. at 836.
144. Id. at 838.
145. This is consistent with Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419
(1982). See supra notes 57-82 and accompanying text.
In earlier 1987 opinions, the Court reaffirmed the continuing viability of the Penn Central
economic analysis factors. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S.
470, 493-97 (1987) (citing Penn Central for its economic viability test, but not employing the
specific factors because the claimant failed to prove that the Subsidence Act rendered its
property commercially unprofitable); Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 714 (1987) (testing the
economic impact, questioning investment-backed expectations, and finding an average
reciprocity of advantage).
146. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 843 n.1, 843-53 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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tight that fit must be. In that regard, the Court gave examples of
permissible regulations that would protect the public's ability to see
the beach that may assist courts in future analysis. 147 For example,
permissible regulation would include a height limitation, a width
restriction, a ban on fences, or a requirement for a viewing spot on the
property for passersby.' 48 In the context of this Comment, as long as
the means "substantially advance" the purpose of the regulation, Nol-
lan should not affect the legislature's ability to prohibit demolition of
existing buildings to preserve the status quo of housing to prevent a
further spillage of homeless persons into the streets. 149
3. CONCEPTUAL SEVERANCE
Professor Margaret Jane Radin believes that "conceptual sever-
ance" is a third mode of takings analysis that is gaining favor with the
Court.3 o The following discussion will define conceptual severance
and show that conceptual severance is not a separate method the
Court uses to find a taking. On the contrary, the cases in which one
could argue that the Court has used conceptual severance fit within
the permanent physical invasion and Penn Central tests discussed
above. 151
The Court has characterized property rights in a physical thing
as a bundle of strands encompassing the rights to use, possess, and
dispose of the property. 152 When governmental action causes a per-
manent physical invasion by placing or permitting a structure on pri-
vate property, the Court deems it a taking without regard to the
economic impact of the regulation or its beneficial purpose. 53 This is
because the invasion does not "simply take a single 'strand' from the
'bundle' of property rights: it chops through the bundle, taking a slice
of every strand."' 54  The owner is denied the right to possess the
space himself and has no power to exclude the occupier from posses-
sion and use of that space.' 55 Professor Radin has termed this method
147. Id. at 836.
148. Id.
149. Seawall Assocs. v. City of New York, 74 N.Y.2d 92, 542 N.E.2d 1059, 544 N.Y.S.2d
542, cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 500 (1989).
150. See Radin, supra note 92, at 1667 (Radin believes there is a trend in constitutional
takings cases that favors conceptual severance.).
151. For a discussion of the permanent physical takings test, see supra notes 54-87 and
accompanying text. For a discussion of the Penn Central test, see supra notes 93-118 and
accompanying text.
152. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982); see
Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-67 (1979).
153. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 434-35.




of analysis conceptual severance. 156 She explains conceptual sever-
ance as:
delineating a property interest consisting of just what the govern-
ment action has removed from the owner, and then asserting that
that particular whole thing has been permanently taken..... [T]his
strategy hypothetically or conceptually "severs" from the whole
bundle of rights just those strands that are interfered with by the
regulation, and then hypothetically or conceptually construes those
strands in the aggregate as a separate whole thing.
157
With rare exception, the Court has required more than an abro-
gation of essential strands alone to constitute a taking.15 Unless there
is a permanent physical invasion, land use regulations are subject
either to the Penn Central multi-factor balancing test159 or to the Nol-
lan test' 6° to determine if a taking has resulted. In Penn Central, the
Court explained that:
"Taking" jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete
segments and attempt to determine whether rights in a particular
segment have been entirely abrogated. In deciding whether a par-
ticular governmental action has effected a taking, this Court
focuses rather both on the character of the action and on the nature
and extent of the interference with rights in the parcel as a whole
161
The Court recognizes that were it to constitutionalize the conceptual
severance theory, even a small restriction on the use of property could
constitute a taking.' 62 The case law illustrates that the Court has
found a taking based on conceptual severance only in permanent
physical occupation cases.
In turning to physical invasions, Loretto v. Teleprompter Man-
hattan CA TV Corp. 1 61 provides the clearest example of the Court's
use of conceptual severance. In Loretto, the Court held that a law
forcing landlords to allow placement of television cables on their
buildings for a nominal fee caused a per se taking.' It explained that
a permanent physical occupation effectively destroys each of the
156. Radin, supra note 92, at 1676.
157. Id.
158. See infra notes 173-217 and accompanying text.
159. For a discussion of the Penn Central balancing test, see supra notes 93-118 and
accompanying text.
160. For a discussion of the Nollan balancing test, see supra notes 130-49 and
accompanying text.
161. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31 (1978) (emphasis
added).
162. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 498 (1987).
163. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
164. Id. at 435.
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rights in the owner's bundle-the rights to possess, use, and dispose of
property. 65  The owner has no right to possess the occupied space
because he cannot exclude the occupier. 66 He has no right to make
nonpossessory use of it. 167 Finally, although he may retain the bare
legal right to dispose of the property, the right is emptied of value
because the purchaser will be unable to make use of it.' 6' Thus,
although Loretto still owned the building, the Court conceptually sev-
ered the fee simple absolute in the space occupied by the cable from
the remaining property to find a taking.169
The rule announced four years earlier in Penn Central-that
property rights are not separated out for takings purposes-did not
apply to the case of a permanent physical occupation because "the
property owner entertains a historically rooted expectation of com-
pensation, and the character of the invasion is qualitatively more
intrusive than perhaps any other category of property regulation."1 7
0
However, the Court stressed that it could not question a state's
"broad power to impose appropriate restrictions upon an owner's use
of his property"'' 71 in cases of landmarking and non-permanent physi-
cal invasions. 172 Therefore, unless the invasion is permanent, the
Court has required something more before a taking will be found on
conceptual severance grounds. 73 That "something more" is that the
regulation not only must restrict or abrogate an essential strand in the
bundle, but also must cause a substantial economic impact, which is
consistent with the Penn Central test.
74
This analysis is supported by two physical invasion cases, Kaiser
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 436.
168. Id.
169. See Radin, supra note 92, at 1676.
170. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 441.
171. Id.
172. See id. at 426-35.
[T]he Court has often upheld substantial regulation of an owner's use of his own
property where deemed necessary to promote the public interest. At the same
time, we have long considered a physical intrusion by government to be a
property restriction of an unusually serious character for purposes of the Takings
Clause. Our cases further establish that when the physical intrusion reaches the
extreme form of a permanent physical occupation, a taking has occurred.
Id. at 426.
173. See PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 84 (1980) (holding that no
taking occurred because property owners "failed to demonstrate that the 'right to exclude
others' [was] so essential to the use or economic value of their property that the state-
authorized limitation of it amounted to a 'taking' ").
174. See infra notes 173-217 and accompanying text.
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Aetna v. United States 7 ' and PruneYard Shopping Center v. Rob-
ins,17 6 which involved restrictions on the right of possession-or an
abrogation of the right to exclude others-in which the economic
impact factor was determinative in the Court's holdings. In Kaiser
Aetna, the government took private property by asserting that a pri-
vate marina, created when a developer dredged a pond and connected
it to the Pacific Ocean, was subject to a right of public access. 177 The
Court viewed the governmental action as severing an easement from
the property. 77 The Court stressed that the servitude frustrated the
owner's investment-backed expectations because the developer had
invested millions of dollars with governmental approval to dredge the
pond.' 79 Thus, the combination of the conceptually severed easement
in the property, coupled with the substantial devaluation of the
owner's investment, required compensation. 80
Conversely, in PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins,'' the
Court did not find a taking when state law precluded the owners of a
shopping center from removing handbillers from their property.8 2
Conceptually, the state gave handbillers an easement over the shop-
ping center property in order to voice political opinions. 8 3 Unlike
Kaiser Aetna, however, no taking resulted because the property own-
ers had "failed to demonstrate that the 'right to exclude others' [was]
... essential to the use or economic value of their property."'' 8 4 These
two opinions are entirely consistent with the Penn Central balancing
test requiring the Court to weigh the economic impact of the restric-
tion to determine whether the regulation precludes the owners from
earning a reasonable rate of return on the property.'85
Similarly, two opinions discussing restrictions on the right of dis-
position indicate that the deciding factor in striking or upholding the
governmental action is the economic impact factor. In Hodel v.
Irving, 6 the Court held that abrogation of the right to pass on prop-
erty at death constituted a taking. 87 Seeking to remedy the problem
175. 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
176. 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
177. Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 180.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 167-69.
180. Id. at 179-80.
181. 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
182. Id. at 84.
183. Id. at 77-78.
184. Id. at 84.
185. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 131-34 (1978).
186. 481 U.S. 704 (1987).,
187. Id. at 717.
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of extreme fractionization of Indian lands, Congress passed a law pro-
viding that certain undivided fractional interests in restricted land
within a tribe's reservation would escheat to the tribe."'s The right to
dispose of property at death was conceptually severed from the
remaining property rights of use and possession, thus leaving the
property owner with a life estate. 8 9 Applying a multi-factor balanc-
ing test, 90 the Court determined that the economic impact of this law
on property owners could be substantial. 9 Combined with the char-
acter of the governmental action-abrogation of both the rights of
descent and devise-the Act worked a taking of the owners'
properties. 192
On the other hand, in Andrus v. Allard, 93 abrogation of the right
to sell eagle feathers acquired prior to the passage of conservation
statutes194 designed to prevent the destruction of certain bird species
did not constitute a taking because the owner was left with economic
value.' 95 The Court explained that:
[A] significant restriction ha[d] been imposed on one means of dis-
posing of the artifacts. But the denial of one traditional property
right does not always amount to a taking. At least where an owner
possesses a full "bundle" of property rights, the destruction of one
"strand" of the bundle is not a taking, because the aggregate must
be viewed in its entirety. 96
In analyzing the economic impact of the regulation, the Court noted
that "a reduction in the value of property is not necessarily equated
with a taking."'' 97 The Court felt that Allard would be able to derive
economic benefit from the artifacts-for instance, by exhibiting them
188. Indian Land Consolidation Act, Pub. L. No. 97-459, §§ 201-211, 96 Stat. 2519 (1983)
(codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 2206 (1988)). Interests of two percent or less of the total
acreage in the particular tract that had earned less than $100 in the previous year would
escheat to the tribe. Id. § 207.
189. See Radin, supra note 92, at 1673 (discussing Court's holding that disposition at death
could not be abrogated).
190. The Court employed the test set forth in Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York,
438 U.S. 104 (1978), and analyzed the economic impact of the regulation, its interference with
reasonable investment-backed expectations, and the character of the governmental action to
determine whether the law worked a taking. Irving, 481 U.S. at 714.
191. Irving, 481 U.S. at 714.
192. Id. at 716-17.
193. 444 U.S. 51 (1979).
194. See Eagle Protection Act § 1, 16 U.S.C. § 668(a) (1988) (prohibiting commercial
transactions in eagles or eagle parts); Migratory Bird Treaty Act § 2, 16 U.S.C. § 703 (1988)
(prohibiting commercial transactions in any migratory birds or migratory bird parts).
195. Andrus, 444 U.S. at 66-68.
196. Id. at 65-66 (citations omitted).
197. Id. at 66.
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for an admissions price-even though the Act prohibited sale.19
Hence, the Court upheld the Act after weighing the economic impact
against the restriction on disposition.199
Finally, two cases discussing use restrictions show that the gov-
ernment's action can cause an owner to lose millions of dollars with-
out effecting a taking. In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of
New York,2"° the landmark law caused the owner of Grand Central
Terminal to lose millions of dollars in yearly revenues by restricting
its ability to build in the air space above the Terminal--conceptually
severing the air rights from the remainder of the parcel.201 It did not
effect a taking, however, because Penn Central could still earn a rea-
sonable rate of return on its property, was not deprived of its invest-
ment-backed expectations, and could transfer the development rights
to other parcels.2 "2 Thus, the extent of the economic diminution on
the property as a whole was not significant enough for the Court to
strike the law.20 3
Similarly, in Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedic-
tis,2° the Court upheld the Subsidence Act 2°5 although it deprived
colliery owners of most of the support estate underlying their prop-
erty.2°' The Act required coal companies to leave a certain amount of
coal in place to provide support for surface structures.20 7 The Court
rejected the coal companies' argument that the Act had severed their
support estate from the remainder of their property and noted that
"the test for regulatory takings requires us to compare the value that
has been taken from the property with the value that remains. 
' 208
The coal companies facially challenged the law.2°9 Thus, although
the Act conceptually severed thirty million dollars worth of coal from
the remainder of the land, no taking resulted because the owners
failed to show that the regulation made their property economically
unviable.21°
198. Id.
199. Id. at 64.
200. 438 U.S. 104 (1978). For a discussion of the facts and analysis of Penn Central, see
supra notes 93-118 and accompanying text.
201. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 116.
202. Ia at 135-38.
203. Id
204. 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
205. Bituminous Mine Subsidence & Land Conservation Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52,
§ 1406 (Purdon Supp. 1990).
206. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 497.
207. Id. at 476 n.6.
208. I.d. at 497.
209. Id. at 499-502.
210. Id. Sixty-five years earlier, in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922),
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In Keystone, the Court alluded to the problem that results when
property is conceptually divided into discrete segments.21" ' Takings
jurisprudence would become a slippery slope because every land use
regulation abrogates some property rights.21 2 The Court explained
that zoning ordinances place limits on the property owner's right to
make profitable use of some segments of his property.2"3 Under the
coal companies' theory, however, "one could always argue that a set-
back ordinance requiring that no structure be built within a certain
distance from the property line constitutes a taking because the foot-
age represents a distinct segment of property for takings law
purposes.
'214
the Court came to the opposite conclusion on nearly identical facts. In 1878, Pennsylvania
Coal Company had deeded the surface rights to Mahon's predecessor in interest, reserving the
right to remove the coal. Id. at 412. In 1921, the Pennsylvania legislature passed the Kohler
Act, a statute prohibiting mining that caused subsidence under certain structures. Id. When
Pennsylvania Coal served the Mahons with notice that the coal company's mining operations
would soon reach a point where it would cause subsidence to the surface, the Mahons sought
an injunction. Id. at 414. Acknowledging that Pennsylvania deemed the surface and
subsurface estates as separate valuable interests, the Court held the Kohler Act an
unconstitutional taking of the coal company's property because it served to protect only
private interests, rather than public interests, and destroyed the economic value of the coal
company's property. Id. at 414-15. The Court noted, "To make it commercially impracticable
to mine certain coal has nearly the same effect for constitutional purposes as appropriating or
destroying it." Id.
In 1987, recognizing Mahon as adverse precedent, the Court distinguished it from the
facts and statute in Keystone on two grounds. First, unlike the Subsidence Act, the Kohler Act
served only private interests, not health or safety purposes. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 484. Second,
unlike the Subsidence Act, the Kohler Act "made it 'commercially impracticable' to mine
'certain coal' in the areas affected by the Kohler Act." Id. Even though the Subsidence Act
deprived the coal companies in Keystone of thirty million dollars worth of coal, the Court
found that "there (was] no record in [Keystone] to support a finding, similar to the one the
Court made in [Mahon], that the Subsidence Act makes it impossible for petitioners to
profitably engage in their business, or that there has been undue interference with their
investment-backed expectations." Id. at 485.
The Mahon Court engaged in a mode of analysis consistent with what is now known as
the multi-factor balancing tests under either Penn Central or Nollan. See id. (noting that the
factors that the Mahon Court considered relevant "have become integral parts of our takings
analysis"). Recognizing that the surface and subsurface estates were two separate interests in
property under state law, the Mahon Court held that the deprivation of the coal company's
estate, when coupled with a substantial adverse economic impact, caused a taking. Mahon,
260 U.S. at 414-15. This is consistent with the argument advanced in this Comment that
unless the governmental action causes a permanent physical occupation, the Court requires
more than an abrogation of property interests alone to constitute a taking.
211. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 498.
212. See id.
213. Id.
214. Id. In Penn Central, the Court was concerned with the same slippery slope argument.
It noted that property owners could not establish a taking "simply by showing that they have
been denied the ability to exploit a property interest that they heretofore had believed was
available for development." Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 130
(1978). Otherwise, the Court reasoned, it would have erred in upholding laws restricting the
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Accordingly, as the case law illustrates, the Court's use of con-
ceptual severance to invalidate land use restrictions arguably has been
limited to the permanent physical occupation cases.2"' When a
restriction does not cause a permanent physical occupation, the regu-
lation is subjected to a Nollan or Penn Central multi-factor balancing
test to determine whether the character of the action-abrogation of
an essential right such as use, possession, or disposition-coupled
with the extent of the economic impact, causes a taking. When
presented with a facial challenge, the Court determines whether the
mere enactment of the law makes the property economically unvi-
able.216 If not, the restriction is upheld.21 7
III. THE SEA WALL HOLDING AND REASONING
In Seawall Associates v. City of New York,218 the New York
Court of Appeals determined that Local Law No. 9 caused both a
physical and a regulatory taking of Seawall's property. 21 9 Following
the opinion's format, each line of analysis will be discussed separately
below.
A. Physical Taking
The Seawall court held that the mandatory rental provisions of
Local Law No. 9 caused a physical taking of Seawall's property.220
"[W]here, as here, owners are forced to accept the occupation of their
properties by persons not already in residence, the resulting depriva-
tion of rights in those properties is sufficient to constitute a physical
taking for which compensation is required. ' 22  The court explained
that the most important of the various rights of an owner is the right
to exclude others from using or occupying one's space.2 22 Further, in
quoting from Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CA TV Corp. ,223 the
development of air rights, and subjacent and lateral development of particular parcels. Id; see
Radin, supra note 92, at 1678 (noting that "as soon as one adopts conceptual severance,...
[e]very curtailment of any of the liberal indicia of property, every regulation of any portion of
an owner's 'bundle of sticks,' is a taking of the whole of that particular portion considered
separately").
215. See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982)
(permanent physical occupation by cable television wires).
216. See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
217. Id. at 493-98.
218. 74 N.Y.2d 92, 542 N.E.2d 1059, 544 N.Y.S.2d 542, cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 500 (1989).
219. Id. at 99, 542 N.E.2d at 1061, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 544.
220. Id. at 103, 542 N.E.2d at 1063, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 546.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
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Seawall court explained that an owner suffers a special kind of injury
when a stranger directly invades and occupies the owner's property.
224
The Seawall court compared Local Law No. 9's rental provisions
to the mandated installation of cable television wires,225 permanent
flooding from the construction of a dam,226 and the invasion of air
space by continuous low flying airplanes.227 It rejected the City's
argument that a physical taking requires an "actual displacement of
the owner's possession" by a fixed encroachment like the television
equipment or permanent flooding.228 Instead, quoting from Nollan,
the court analogized the rental requirement to a forced public ease-
ment: "[A] physical occupation requiring just compensation results
where individuals are given the 'right to pass to and fro, so that the
real property may continuously be traversed, even though no particu-
lar individual is permitted to station himself permanently upon the
premises.' ,229
The Seawall court acknowledged that the Supreme Court "has
not passed on the specific issue of whether the loss of possessory inter-
ests, including the right to exclude, resulting from tenancies coerced
by the government would constitute a per se physical taking. ' 230 It
was confident, however, that the Supreme Court would invalidate
such a regulation because, in the Seawall court's opinion, the "forced
occupancy of one's property" is much more offensive and invasive
than the navigational servitude in Kaiser Aetna or the installation of
television equipment in Loretto.23 1 Further, the Seawall court noted
that although the Supreme Court initially did not characterize the
Kaiser Aetna easement as a per se taking,232 the Court recharacterized
it as a per se taking in Nollan. 2 33
The City argued that Local Law No. 9 should be upheld based
on Supreme Court precedent validating housing and rental regula-
tions even where they placed severe restrictions on an owner's use of
224. Seawall, 74 N.Y.2d at 103, 542 N.E.2d at 1063, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 546 (quoting Loretto,
458 U.S. at 436).
225. Id. at 102, 542 N.E.2d at 1063, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 546 (citing Loretto, 458 U.S. at 427).
226. Id. at 103, 542 N.E.2d at 1063, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 546 (citing United States v. Lynah,
188 U.S. 445 (1902)).
227. Id. (citing United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946)).
228. Id. at 104, 542 N.E.2d at 1063, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 546.
229. Id. at 104, 542 N.E.2d at 1063-64, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 546-47 (quoting Nollan v.
California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 832 (1987)). The court also compared Local Law
No. 9's rental requirement to the navigational servitude in Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444
U.S. 164 (1979), which required public access to a private marina. Id.
230. Seawall, 74 N.Y.2d at 104, 542 N.E.2d at 1064, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 547.
231. Id.
232. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 433 (1982).
233. Seawall, 74 N.Y.2d at 104 n.3, 542 N.E.2d at 1064 n.3, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 547 n.3.
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its property.234 The Seawall court distinguished cases upholding rent
control and anti-eviction statutes by the involuntary nature of Local
Law No. 9. Unlike Local Law No. 9, the court explained, rent con-
trol and other landlord-tenant regulations involve restrictions on
existing tenancies where landlords had voluntarily put their proper-
ties to rental use.23 Local Law No. 9, however, "force[s] the owners
in the first instance to subject their properties to a use which they
neither planned nor desired. '236
The court also found unpersuasive the City's argument that
Local Law No. 9 did not cause a taking because it did not divest the
property owners of all control over their properties.2 37 The court said
that although the owners retained the right to select tenants and
rental terms, it was the forced occupation of the units-not the ten-




In the regulatory takings analysis, the Seawall court employed
the Nollan 2 39 two-part test.240 First, without considering the buy-out,
replacement, or hardship exemptions, the court determined that the
anti-demolition, rent-up, and renovation provisions of Local Law No.
9 deprived Seawall of economically viable use of its property.241 Then
it determined that the means used did not substantially advance the
City's purpose of preventing homelessness. 242
The Seawall court used the conceptual severance theory to deter-
mine that Local Law No. 9 denied owners economically viable use of
their properties by abrogating or substantially impairing the "prop-
erty owners' basic rights 'to possess, use and dispose' of their build-
ings."' 24 3 Coerced rentals deprived owners of possession by causing a
permanent physical invasion of their properties. 2" The rent-up
requirement and the prohibition on conversion denied owners the
ability to use their properties as they deemed fit or to dispose of them
234. Id. at 105, 542 N.E.2d at 1064, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 547.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 105, 542 N.E.2d at 1064-65, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 547-48.
237. Id. at 106, 542 N.E.2d at 1065, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 548.
238. Id.
239. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
240. See supra notes 130-49 and accompanying text.
241. Seawall, 74 N.Y.2d at 107-10, 542 N.E.2d at 1066-68, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 548-50.
242. Id. at 111-12, 542 N.E.2d at 1068-69, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 551-52.
243. Id. at 108, 542 N.E.2d at 1066, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 549 (quoting Loretto v. Teleprompter
Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982)).
244. Id.
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"for any sums approaching their investments. 24
Analyzing Local Law No. 9's effect on the property as a
whole, 46 the court contrasted the effect of Local Law No. 9 with the
effect of the Landmark Law upheld in Penn Central. The court noted
that the Landmark Law, unlike Local Law No. 9, "denied the owner
of Grand Central neither the continued full use of its property nor a
reasonable return on its investment. '247 It also contrasted Local Law
No. 9 with the Subsidence Act in Keystone. Although the Subsidence
Act reduced the total amount of coal that could be mined, the court
noted that, unlike Local Law No. 9, it "did not interfere with the
owners' rights to continue to mine coal profitably. 248
Finally, the court rejected the City's argument that Local Law
No. 9's economic effect must be assessed by "comparing the value of
the rights [to be] affected or abrogated with the value of the total
'bundle' comprising the owners' property interests."2 49 Instead, the
court noted that permanent abrogation of one of the property rights,
"without regard to its comparative value in relation to the whole, may
well be sufficient to constitute a taking. ' 2 0 It based this assumption
on two cases: Hodel v. Irving,25' in which the permanent abrogation
of the right to devise property constituted a taking;25 2 and Nollan v.
California Coastal Commission,5 3 in which an easement of passage
"could constitute a taking despite the minimal impact on the total
value of the owners' property. ' 25 4 The court concluded that whether
the abolished or impaired property rights are considered alone, as in
245. Id.
246. In its conclusion, the Seawall court indicated that it was relying on its Penn Central
and Keystone analogies to support an economic analysis of Local Law No. 9's effect on the
property as a whole. See id. at 110, 542 N.E.2d at 1068, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 551.
247. Id. at 108, 542 N.E.2d at 1066, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 549. The Seawall court also pointed
out that Penn Central had not been deprived of pre-existing air rights because they were
transferable. Id. at 108 n.8, 542 N.E.2d at 1066 n.8, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 549-50 n.8.
248. Id. at 109, 542 N.E.2d at 1067, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 550. In Keystone, the owners could
profitably engage in mining because they were only prevented from extracting two percent of
their coal. Id. at 109 n.9, 542 N.E.2d at 1067 n.9, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 550 n.9.
249. Id. at 109-110, 542 N.E.2d at 1067, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 550.
250. Id.
251. 481 U.S. 704 (1987).
252. Seawall, 74 N.Y.2d at 110, 542 N.E.2d at 1067, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 550 (citing Hodel, 481
U.S. at 715-17).
253. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
254. Seawall, 74 N.Y.2d at 110, 542 N.E.2d at 1067, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 550 (citing Nollan,
483 U.S. at 831-32). The Seawall court also cited various law review articles discussing the
conceptual severance theory. See Fischel, Introduction: Utilitarian Balancing and Formalism
in Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1581, 1592-93 (1988); Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88 COLUM.
L. REV. 1600, 1627-28 (1988); Peterson, Land Use Regulatory "Takings" Revisited: The New




Hodel and Nollan, or are compared with the values of the properties
as a whole, as in Penn Central and Keystone, the conclusion is the
same: The effect of Local Law No. 9 "is unconstitutionally to deprive
owners of economically viable use of their properties."'255
Next, the Seawall court turned to the second part of the Nollan
test and asked whether the burdens imposed by Local Law No. 9 sub-
stantially advanced legitimate state interests.256 In holding that they
did not, the court emphasized that the end sought by Local Law No.
9-alleviating the critical problems of homelessness-was of the
greatest societal importance. 257 It could not agree, however, that
"imposing the burdens of the forced refurbishing and rent-up provi-
sions on the owners of SRO properties substantially advances the aim
of alleviating the homelessness problem[.] ''258
The City argued that "by increasing the availability of SRO
units[,] the antiwarehousing and moratorium measures [would] pro-
vide more low-cost housing, . . . [thus] alleviating homelessness. "259
The court, however, found the relationship between means and ends
"indirect at best and conjectural." 26° Unlike the Landmark Law in
Penn Central,261 which had the direct effect of saving a landmark, the
Seawall court could not agree that Local Law No. 9 would actually
ameliorate the homelessness crisis.262 The SRO units were not
earmarked for the homeless or potentially homeless and the City's
own study showed that a ban on SRO conversion or demolition would
do little to resolve the homelessness crisis. 263 The connection between
the means and the ends was thus too weak to justify imposing virtu-
ally the entire cost of the program on a small segment of society, the
SRO property owners.2 6
Finally, after determining that Local Law No. 9 was unconstitu-
tional, the Seawall court determined that the buy-out, 265 replace-
255. Seawall, 74 N.Y.2d at 110, 542 N.E.2d at 1068, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 551.
256. IdM at 110-11, 542 N.E.2d at 1068-69, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 551-52.
257. Id. The court noted that the City claimed that the purpose of Local Law No. 9 was to
prevent homelessness. Id. at 111 n.10, 542 N.E.2d at 1068 n.10, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 551 n.10.
258. Id. at 111, 542 N.E.2d at 1068, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 551 (citing Nollan v. California
Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987)).
259. Id.
260. Id. at 112, 542 N.E.2d at 1069, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 552.
261. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 109-15 (1978).
262. Seawall, 74 N.Y.2d at 111-12, 542 N.E.2d at 1068-69, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 551-52.
263. Id. at 111, 542 N.E.2d at 1068, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 551.
264. Id.
265. NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 27.198.2[d][4][a][i] (1987); see supra notes 28 &
31 and accompanying text.
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ment,266 and hardship exemptions267 could not "mitigate the invidious
effects of the law" to make it "constitutionally acceptable."26 "In
effect, the City... is saying no more to the owners than that it will
not do something unconstitutional if they pay the City not to do
it."' 269  Such a ransom would be "'an out-and-out plan of
extortion.' "270
IV. ANALYSIS OF SEAWALL
A. Physical Taking
In holding that Local Law No. 9 constituted a physical taking,
the Seawall court's reliance on Loretto was misplaced; consequently,
its conclusion was erroneous. As explained in Section II of this Com-
ment, Loretto holds that only permanent physical occupations of
property authorized by the government constitute per se takings2 71 -
that is, the analysis is done without regard to the public purpose or
economic impact of the law.272 Other cases involving temporary,
albeit substantial, physical invasions were not takings under Loretto's
bright line rule.273
The permanence and absolute exclusivity of a physical occupation
distinguish it from temporary limitations on the right to exclude.
Not every physical invasion is a taking .... [S]uch temporary limi-
tations are subject to a more complex balancing process to deter-
mine whether they are a taking. The rationale is evident: they do
not absolutely dispossess the owner of his rights to use, and
exclude others from, his property.274
Further, Loretto stressed that its bright line rule was "nar-
266. NEw YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 27.198.2[d][4][a][ii] (1987); see supra notes 29 &
32 and accompanying text.
267. NEw YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 27.198.2[d][4][b][i] (1987); see supra notes 30 &
33-34 and accompanying text.
268. Seawall, 74 N.Y.2d at 113-15, 542 N.E.2d at 1069-70, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 552-53.
269. Id. at 113, 542 N.E.2d at 1069, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 552.
270. Id. at 114, 542 N.E.2d at 1070, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 553 (quoting Nollan v. California
Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987) (quoting J.E.D. Assocs. v. Atkinson, 121 N.H. 581,
584, 432 A.2d 12, 14-15 (1981))).
271. See supra notes 57-82 and accompanying text.
272. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 435, 441 (1982).
273. The Loretto Court explained that although Kaiser involved a "government intrusion of
an unusually serious character"-requiring public access to a private marina-it was not a
taking per se because it was not permanent. Id. at 433; see also PruneYard Shopping Center v.
Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980) (state law requiring shopping centers to permit individuals to
exercise free speech and petition rights on their property not a taking because "the invasion
was temporary and limited in nature ...[and] the fact that [the solicitors] may have
'physically invaded' [the owners'] property cannot be viewed as determinative").
274. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 435 n.12.
[Vol. 45:467
STONEWALLED BY SEAWALL
row," 275 and that it did not affect the "substantial authority upholding
a State's broad power to impose appropriate restrictions upon an
owner's use of his property' 276 or landlord-tenant relations.277
"States have broad power to regulate housing conditions in general
and the landlord-tenant relationship in particular without paying
compensation for all economic injuries that such regulation
entails. 278
Nollan did not change this result. 9 In dicta, the Court said that
if the Commission required the Nollans to convey an easement out-
right-not conditioned on a building permit-to give persons the
"right to pass to and fro, so that the real property may continuously
be traversed," a permanent physical occupation occurs.2 80  Nollan
concerned an actual permanent conveyance of property, not a land
use restriction or a physical invasion of a temporary nature.281 In the
absence of a permanent physical occupation or a conveyance of a
property interest, a court must engage in Nollan's two-part test and
ask whether the governmental action substantially advances a legiti-
mate state purpose without denying the owner economically viable
use of its property.2 82
In Seawall, the mandatory rent-up provisions of Local Law No.
9, unlike an easement, did not cause a permanent physical occupation
of Seawall's property because Local Law No. 9 was not "permanent
in its individual application or in its limited ... duration. ' 28 3 Also,
275. Id. at 441.
276. Id.
277. Id. at 440.
278. Id.
279. In Nollan, the Commission required the Nollans to record a deed restriction granting
an easement for the public to pass along their beachfront as a condition of building a larger
house on their property. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 828 (1987).
Because the condition was not substantially related to a legitimate public purpose, the Supreme
Court's two-part test did not save the condition from being unconstitutional. Id. at 838-42; see
supra notes 139-49 and accompanying text.
280. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 832.
281. Id. at 832 & n. 1. Arguably, at least, Seawall is therefore distinguishable as Local Law
No. 9 could be characterized as merely a use restriction.
282. Id. at 834 (quoting Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)).
283. Seawall Assocs. v. City of New York, 74 N.Y.2d 92, 123, 542 N.E.2d 1059, 1076, 544
N.Y.S.2d 542, 559 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 500 (1989). Local Law
No. 9 was to expire in five years unless extended prior to its expiration if the serious public
emergency resulting from the loss of SRO's persisted. New York, N.Y., Local Laws No. 9, § 7
(Mar. 6, 1987). Even so, the Seawall court held that "[u]nder First Lutheran ... where, as
here, the governmental action resulted in a per se taking, the offending action constitutes a
taking for whatever time period it is in effect." Id. at 106 n.5, 542 N.E.2d at 1065 n.5, 544
N.Y.S.2d at 548 n.5 (citing First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles
County, 482 U.S. 304 (1987)). In First Lutheran, the Supreme Court held that compensation
must be paid even for temporary takings. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los
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Seawall Local Law No. 9 gave several methods to exclude others. It
could exercise the buy-out option,2 s4 the replacement option, s or
apply for a hardship exemption if it could not earn a reasonable rate
of return on the assessed value of its property as an SRO. 8 6 Finally,
Seawall was able to make use of all of its property by renting it out as
SRO's. 2 7 Therefore, because Local Law No. 9 did not violate either
the bright line test of permanent physical occupation-a permanent
occupation of property-or the concerns underlying Loretto's rule-
permanent deprivation of the ability to use, possess, or dispose of the
property- 28 8 the Court should not have held Local Law No. 9 a per
se taking. 8 9
Angeles County, 482 U.S. 304, 322 (1987). The problem with Seawall's analogy is that the
Supreme Court did not determine that a per se taking had occurred in First Lutheran. Id. at
313. The Court assumed a taking only for the purpose of reaching the remedial question. Id.
The Court noted:
We accordingly have no occasion to decide whether the ordinance at issue
ictually denied appellant all use of its property or whether the county might
avoid the conclusion that a compensable taking had occurred by establishing that
denial of all use [of First Lutheran's property] was insulated as a part of the
State's authority to enact safety regulations.
Id.
Seawall argued persuasively that Local Law No. 9 should be viewed as permanent since
rent control ordinances also were enacted as "temporary" measures and are still in effect 46
years later. Reply Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant Seawall Associates at 27 n.19, Seawall (No.
20891/86) [hereinafter Seawall Reply Brief].
284. NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 27-198.2[d][4][a][i] (1987); see supra notes 28 &
31 and accompanying text.
285. NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 27.198.2[d][4][a][ii] (1987); see supra notes 29 &
32 and accompanying text.
286. NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 27.198.2[d][4][b][i] (1987); see supra notes 30 &
33-34 and accompanying text.
The Supreme Court has not defined "reasonable rate of return" in numerical terms. The
City patterned Local Law No. 9's hardship provision, however, after rent control ordinances
which allow landlords to "evict tenants to withdraw [a] building from the housing market if
the landlord is not able to earn an 8 1/2% return on the building's assessed value." Municipal
Respondents' Brief, supra note 12, at 43 (citing NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN CODE § 26-
408[b](5)(a)); see also Intervenor's Brief, supra note 11, at 39. These rent control ordinances
have withstood constitutional challenges. See, e.g., Benson Realty Corp. v. Beame, 50 N.Y.2d
994, 409 N.E.2d 948, 431 N.Y.S.2d 475 (1980), appeal dismissed, 449 U.S. 1119 (1981).
287. The Loretto Court noted that it was not questioning the "substantial authority
upholding a State's broad power to impose appropriate restrictions upon an owner's use of his
property." Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 441 (1982).
Thus, as long as the restriction imposed does not mandate permanent physical occupation, no
per se taking occurs because the owner can still use his property.
288. Loretto stressed that the reason a permanent physical occupation is so serious is
because the property owner forever loses the right to make use of the property. Id. at 436.
289. But cf Note, supra note 44, at 115-25 (arguing that property owners should applaud
the Seawall opinion for discarding the traditional physical takings test that too often fails to
protect private property owners by focusing on actual physical encroachments rather than the
owner's intangible rights of possession, exclusion, and dominion).
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B. Regulatory Taking
In its regulatory takings analysis,29° the Seawall court departed
from settled Supreme Court jurisprudence in two ways: by utilizing
the conceptual severance mode of analysis, and by invalidating Local
Law No. 9 on a facial attack. 291 In addition, the court's over-broad
characterization of the purpose of the law was result-oriented. 292
1. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
In beginning its economic analysis, the Seawall court first looked
solely at the anti-warehousing and anti-demolition provisions to
determine whether Local Law No. 9 denied Seawall economically via-
ble use of its property.293 Separating out the hardship provision that
guarantees a "fair minimum return" 294 from the rest of the law makes
it easy to find Local Law No. 9 unconstitutional, but this approach is
inconsistent with the Supreme Court's prior opinions. For example,
this is not the method employed by the Supreme Court in Penn Cen-
tral.295 When Penn Central challenged the Landmark Preservation
Law as an unconstitutional taking of its property, the Court looked at
the law as a whole.296 It did not determine first that the law was
unconstitutional by denying Penn Central the right to build on top of
Grand Central Terminal and then decide the law was valid because
290. Seawall Assocs. v. City of New York, 74 N.Y.2d 92, 107-10, 115 & n.14, 542 N.E.2d
1059, 1065-68, 1071 &n.14, 544 N.Y.S.2d 542, 548-51, 554&n.14,cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 500
(1989).
291. Regarding facial attacks, the Court has stated that " 'the constitutionality of statutes
ought not to be decided except in an actual factual setting that makes such a decision
necessary.'" Id. at 121, 542 N.E.2d at 1075, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 557 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting)
(quoting Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 451 U.S. 264, 294-95
(1981)); see also supra notes 119-29 and accompanying text.
Regarding conceptual severance, the Court has stated that "'[t]aking jurisprudence does
not divide a single parcel into discrete segments and attempt to determine whether rights in a
particular segment have been entirely abrogated." Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New
York, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31 (1978); see also Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis,
480 U.S. 470, 497-98 (1987) (quoting Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130-31); supra notes 150-217
and accompanying text.
292. See infra notes 331-42 and accompanying text.
293. Seawall, 74 N.Y.2d at 108, 542 N.E.2d at 1066, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 549. After the
Seawall court determined that the anti-warehousing and anti-demolition provisions constituted
a taking, it asked whether the buy-out, the replacement, or the hardship provisions saved it.
Id. at 113, 542 N.E.2d at 1069, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 152.
294. Id. at 125, 542 N.E.2d at 1077, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 560 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting).
295. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); supra notes 93-118
and accompanying text.
296. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 123-38; see Petition [of Municipal Respondents] for Writ of
Certiorari to the New York State Court of Appeals at 17, Seawall Assocs. v. City of New
York, 74 N.Y.2d 92, 542 N.E.2d 1059, 544 N.Y.S.2d 542, cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 500 (1989)
(No. 89-388).
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Penn Central could transfer the restricted development rights to other
buildings.29 7
Next, the Seawall court employed the conceptual severance
method to determine that Local Law No. 9 deprived Seawall of eco-
nomically viable use of its property by abrogating the rights to posses-
sion, use, and disposition.298 Apparently, the Seawall court believed
that Local Law No. 9 gave the renting public a permanent easement
to occupy and use the SRO properties-indefinitely severing all rights
in the properties but the bare title from the owner. 299 The Seawall
court was correct that a permanent deprivation of these rights would
constitute a taking.3 "° Local Law No. 9, however, was not perma-
nent, 30 1 and the buy-out, replacement, and hardship options30 2 pre-
served the owner's rights to possess, use, and dispose of its property.
Thus, the Seawall court expanded the use of the conceptual severance
test beyond anything that the Supreme Court had done,30 3 flying in
the face of the Court's continual admonitions against it.
304
Nonetheless, the Seawall court's analysis clearly illustrates that
its use of conceptual severance was not inadvertent. It rejected the
City's argument that in analyzing economic impact, the Supreme
297. The Supreme Court analyzed the provisions of the Landmark Preservation Law as a
whole. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 123-38.
298. Seawall, 74 N.Y.2d at 107-10, 542 N.E.2d at 1066-68, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 549-51.
Coerced rentals deprived Seawall of its right to possession. Id. at 108, 542 N.E.2d at 1066, 544
N.Y.S.2d at 549. The Seawall court reiterated its per se takings analysis for this proposition.
Id Local Law No. 9 abrogated the right to use because it denied Seawall the right to
demolish, alter, or convert the property. Id. It abrogated the right to dispose because, by
prohibiting redevelopment and mandating rental, Local Law No. 9 "impairs the ability of
owners to sell their properties for any sums approaching their investments." Id.
299. See id. at 104, 542 N.E.2d at 1064, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 547 (comparing the physical
invasion in Seawall to the navigational servitude in Kaiser Aetna and the permanent physical
occupation in Loretto).
300. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 436 (1982).
301. New York, N.Y., Local Laws No. 9, § 7 (Mar. 6, 1987), provided as follows:
Subdivisions a and c of section 27-198.2 of the administrative code shall
expire and shall have no further force or effect on the fifth anniversary date of the
effective date of local law number one of nineteen hundred eighty-seven and on
the anniversary date of such local law occurring in every fifth year thereafter
unless within the thirty day period prior to such anniversary date a local law has
been enacted based upon a finding that the serious public emergency described in
section one of such local law continues to exist.
As mentioned earlier, however, Seawall argued that Local Law No. 9 should be viewed as
permanent because the City also had enacted rent control ordinances as "temporary" meas-
ures, which still are in effect 46 years later. See Seawall Reply Brief, supra note 283, at 27 n. 19.
302. For a discussion of the buy-out, replacement, and hardship options, see supra notes 28-
34 and accompanying text.
303. For a discussion of conceptual severance generally, see supra notes 150-217 and
accompanying text.
304. See supra note 291.
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Court has required that the value of the rights taken be compared
with the value of the bundle as a whole.3 °5 Instead, the Seawall court
relied on Hodel v. Irving30 6 for the proposition that "[t]he rights to
use and to possess have been abolished and, without regard to the
value of the owners' remaining interests in their buildings, that would
be sufficient [to constitute a taking]. ' 30 7 Thus far, the Supreme Court
has not used conceptual severance in this manner.
As explained earlier, the Supreme Court's use of conceptual sev-
erance to invalidate land use restrictions has been limited to the per-
manent physical occupation cases.30 8 When a restriction does not
cause a permanent physical occupation, the regulation is subjected to
a Penn Central multi-factor balancing test to determine whether the
character of the action-abrogation of an essential right such as use,
possession, or disposition-coupled with the extent of the economic
impact, causes a taking. When presented with a facial challenge, as
here, a court must determine whether the mere enactment of the law
makes the property economically unviable.3° If economic value
remains, the restriction must be upheld.310
Here, Local Law No. 9's hardship provision guaranteed Seawall
an eight and one-half percent return on the assessed value of its prop-
erty,31 ' which normally should be enough to sustain a facial chal-
lenge. Consequently, although Local Law No. 9 caused a physical
invasion of Seawall's property, because the invasion was not perma-
nent, the Seawall court should not have deemed it a taking without
proof on an as-applied basis that the law made the property economi-
cally unviable.31 2
Perhaps realizing the thin thread on which its opinion rested, the
305. Seawall Assocs. v. City of New York, 74 N.Y.2d 92, 109-10, 542 N.E.2d 1059, 1067-
68, 544 N.Y.S.2d 542, 550-51, cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 500 (1989). This is interesting when
considering that the Supreme Court repeatedly has held that property is not to be separated
into discrete segments, but rather analyzed as a whole. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n
v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 497 (1987) (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New
York, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31 (1978)).
306. 481 U.S. 704 (1987).
307. Seawall, 74 N.Y.2d at 110, 542 N.E.2d at 1067-68, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 550-51.
308. See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982); see
also supra notes 158-62 and accompanying text.
309. See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
310. Id at 493-98.
311. See NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 27-198.2[d][4][b] (1987).
312. The Seawall court notes that it is not determining whether Local Law No. 9 frustrates
reasonable investment-backed expectations because "[s]uch a factor.., would be relevant to a
challenge to the regulation as applied to particular owners, not a facial challenge." Seawall
Assocs. v. City of New York, 74 N.Y.2d 92, 107 n.6, 542 N.E.2d 1059, 1066 n.6, 544 N.Y.S.2d
542, 549 n.6, cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 500 (1989).
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Seawall court bolstered its argument with more traditional reasoning.
Unfortunately, its conclusions do not follow from its analysis. In ana-
lyzing Local Law No. 9's effect on the property as a whole, the court
contrasted it with the Landmark Preservation Law in Penn Cen-
tral.313 In doing so, it noted that Local Law No. 9 was unlike the
Landmark Preservation Law because Penn Central could continue
fully to use its property and could earn a reasonable rate of return,
while Seawall could not.3 14 Curiously, these factors-use and reason-
able rate of return--do not make Local Law No. 9 unlike the
Landmark Preservation Law. In fact, a deeper analysis shows the
similarity in the laws and leads one to believe that, based on Penn
Central, Local Law No. 9 should have been upheld.
First, in analyzing continued full use, Penn Central could con-
tinue to use its property as a railroad terminal as it had for sixty-five
years. 31 5 Similarly, Seawall could continue-in fact, was compelled-
to use its property as an SRO.316 Second, neither property owner
wanted simply to continue the present use. Penn Central, like Sea-
wall, wanted to enhance its property.37 Both parties were precluded
from doing so, however, because they were placed under repair and
preservation obligations.31 Third, although Penn Central conceded
that it could earn a reasonable rate of return,31 9 the Seawall court
failed to make a like determination regarding Local Law No. 9's effect
on Seawall.320 It failed to do so because in a facial attack such as that
presented, there are no facts in the record for an economic analysis.32 '
If it had analyzed the hardship provision along with the restrictive
portions of the law, in the absence of any empirical evidence that the
provision failed to work, the Seawall court would have had to concede
that the hardship provision guaranteed Seawall an eight and one-half
percent return on the assessed value of its property, 322 enough to
313. Id. at 108, 542 N.E.2d at 1066, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 549.
314. Id. at 108-10, 542 N.E.2d at 1066-68, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 549-51.
315. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 136 (1978).
316. Seawall, 74 N.Y.2d at 108, 542 N.E.2d at 1066, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 549.
317. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 116-17.
318. Id. at 111-12; Seawall, 74 N.Y.2d at 99, 542 N.E.2d at 1060-61, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 543-
44.
319. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130.
320. Seawall, 74 N.Y.2d at 99, 542 N.E.2d at 1061, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 544.
321. Id. at 115 & n.14, 542 N.E.2d at 1071 & n.14, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 554 & n.14.
322. Id. at 101, 542 N.E.2d at 1062, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 545. The Seawall court does point
out, however, that it is unlikely that Seawall's property will produce less than eight and one-
half percent of the assessed value, even though it is subject to rent control and stabilization.
Id. at 114 n.13, 542 N.E.2d at 1070 n.13,'544 N.Y.S.2d at 553 n.13. This is because the
assessed value typically is 45% of the fair market value. Id. Although this return seems
stringent, the City patterned Local Law No. 9 after the City's rent control and stabilization
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defeat a facial attack.323
Next, in analyzing Local Law No. 9's effect on the property as a
whole, the Seawall court distinguished it from the Subsidence Act in
Keystone.324 The court noted that the Subsidence Act allowed owners
to continue to mine coal profitably although it reduced the amount
they could mine.325 However, it noted, Seawall was denied the sole
use for which investment properties are purchased-commercial
development. 326 This is a curious statement in view of the fact that
investors regularly purchase rental properties for rental use. Indeed,
these properties were suited for at least one investment use-rental of
SRO's. Additionally, the reasonableness of a purchaser's expectations
in purchasing property is undermined when the purchaser enters into
a field the City regulates heavily.327 Arguably, Seawall knew, or
should have been aware, when it purchased the SRO's both that the
City regulated SRO use and that it had been searching for solutions to
abate their removal from the market.328 Indeed, the Seawall court's
economic analysis should have taken into account the fact that Sea-
wall probably purchased the SRO's at reduced prices that reflected
the market uncertainty regarding future SRO development.329
Finally, in making its economic analysis, the Seawall court
should have considered the buy-out, replacement, and hardship provi-
sions as escape mechanisms that would have allowed Seawall to use
laws, see Intervenor's Brief, supra note 11, at 48, which were found to be constitutional in
Benson Realty Corp. v. Beame, 50 N.Y.2d 994, 409 N.E.2d 948, 431 N.Y.S.2d 475 (1980).
The Supreme Court has never defined the benchmark for "reasonable rate of return." See
Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130 (assuming, without analysis, that Penn Central could earn a
reasonable rate of return).
323. A facial attack merely asks whether the law necessarily denies the owner economically
viable use of his land, rather than whether the operation of the law in practice has that effect.
See supra notes 119-29 and accompanying text. To prove a taking, Seawall should have
demonstrated that an eight and one-half percent return would not be sufficient in its particular
case. See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 493-97 (1987)
(explaining that economic impact analysis must be conducted with respect to specific
property); Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 129-38 (discussing economic impact factors in
determining on an as-applied basis whether a regulation constitutes a taking).
324. Seawall, 74 N.Y.2d at 109, 542 N.E.2d at 1067, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 550.
325. Id.
326. Id.
327. See, e.g., Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 227 (1986)
("Those who do business in the regulated field cannot object if the legislative scheme is'
buttressed by subsequent amendments to achieve the legislative end."); Peterson, supra note
129, at 346 ("[T]he reasonableness of these expectations is undermined when a series of
government enactments have controlled the development of land for a period of time prior to
purchase, especially if those enactments have been periodically amended.").
328. See supra notes 6-25 and accompanying text.
329. Brief of Amici Curiae, Community Action for Legal Services at 39, Seawall (No.
20891/86).
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the property in the manner it desired. Instead, the Seawall court
facially invalidated Local Law No. 9 without examining the real eco-
nomic impact on Seawall.33°
2. ENDS/MEANS ANALYSIS
The Seawall court's analysis aptly shows that a law's validity is
directly related to how a court characterizes its purpose. The Seawall
court's analysis as to whether Local Law No. 9's means were substan-
tially related to a legitimate state purpose was result-oriented in
assuming that the purpose of Local Law No. 9 was to alleviate or to
cure homelessness. 33' It criticized the City's studies332 for failing to
show that the law "would . . . resolve the homeless crisis, '3 33 and
found that "the nexus between the obligations placed on SRO prop-
erty owners and the alleviation of the highly complex social problem
330. If the Seawall court had performed an as-applied economic analysis, it likely would
have found that some SRO owners would be denied a reasonable rate of return on their
investment, but many certainly would not. See Seawall, 142 A.D.2d 72, 88, 534 N.Y.S.2d 958,
968 (App. Div. 1988) (upholding Local Law No. 9 while urging some owners who would
appear to have a meritorious argument for hardship relief to apply for a hardship exemption),
rev'd, 74 N.Y.2d 92, 542 N.E.2d 1059, 544 N.Y.S.2d 542, cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 500 (1989).
331. See Seawall, 74 N.Y.2d at 111, 542 N.E.2d at 1068, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 551. Notably,
nearly every brief characterized Local Law No. 9's purpose differently. In its caption to part
two of the Nollan test, the City described the law's purpose as preventing homelessness.
Municipal Respondents' Brief, supra note 12, at 31. It then expanded that purpose by stating
that Local Law No. 9 "prevents a further increase in homelessness among current SRO
tenants by barring the destruction or conversion of SRO's." Id. at 32. Intervenors
characterized the purpose as "forestalling displacement and resulting homelessness among
SRO tenants." Intervenor's Brief, supra note 11, at 51. Seawall described the law's purpose as
"aiding the homeless." Seawall Brief, supra note 14, at 44. Appellants, 459 West 43rd Street
Corp., argued that Local Law No. 9 was "intended to extract from the SRO owners substantial
cash contributions to build housing units which will be affordable to citizens of modest
means." 459 West Brief, supra note 24, at 35. Later, it described the law's purpose "to solve
the problem of homelessness." Reply Brief for Appellants 459 West 43rd Street Corp. at 15,
Seawall (No. 20891/86). Anbe Realty charged the City with using the SRO law as an attempt
to solve the homelessness crisis and asked whether "the statutes' proponents [could] assure us
that the streets and public places of New York City will be cleared of derelicts if this Court
upholds the SRO law?" Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant Anbe Realty Co. at 28, Seawall (No.
20891/86). With so many options, it is not surprising that the Seawall court chose a
"purpose" to meet its ends of finding Local Law No. 9 unconstitutional. Tellingly, the Seawall
court noted that other purposes possibly advanced by the law need not be analyzed. Seawall,
74 N.Y.2d at 111 n.10, 542 N.E.2d at 1068 n.10, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 551 n.10. One wonders
whether this is because, had the court chosen another "purpose," that purpose would be
substantially advanced by Local Law No. 9.
332. The City's studies were encompassed in Blackburn, Single Room Occupancy in New
York City (Feb. 1986) (study conducted for and available from Urban Systems Research &
Engineering, New York, New York).
333. Seawall, 74 N.Y.2d at 111, 542 N.E.2d at 1068, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 551. The Blackburn
study emphasized that "an effective policy of housing the homeless would require the City to
acquire housing units from private owners and redistribute them to nonprofit agencies." Brief
of Amicus Curiae, Pacific Legal Foundation at 10, Seawall (No. 20891/86).
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of homelessness is indirect at best and conjectural. 3 34 The City,
however, never claimed that Local Law No. 9 would cure homeless-
ness. It enacted Local Law No. 9 to prevent a further increase in
homelessness due to the loss of SRO units. 33 5 The City's study was
consistent with this goal, recommending "a major effort by the city to
preserve SRO's. ' 336
Further, in holding that Local Law No. 9 "would do little to
resolve the homeless crisis," the Seawall court misused the Nollan
test.337 The nexus test does not require Local Law No. 9 to solve the
homelessness crisis. Rather, the law must be substantially related to
solving the problem.338 In other words, if it contributes a step in the
right direction, the law should meet the nexus test. In this regard, the
court's concern that SRO's were not earmarked for the homeless or
potentially homeless3 39 makes no difference. As long as the result of
the law's operation was that the stock of SRO's remained constant
and more people would not become homeless, the law achieved its
purpose.
Property owners posed similar concerns regarding replacement
units. Because Local Law No. 9 did not require replacement units to
be SRO's,3 4° they argued that the replacement provision bore no rela-
tion to the preservation of SRO's.34 ' But, the City purposely provided
flexibility in constructing replacement units.
In this difficult area of creating low-cost housing, it would be
counterproductive to tie the [Housing] Commissioner's hands by
overly detailed instruction. Because no one can foresee what type
of housing can be acquired or what site will be found in which
zoning district, the law properly establishes only general
guidelines.3 42
334. Seawall, 74 N.Y.2d at 112, 542 N.E.2d at 1069, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 552.
335. See supra note 331.
336. Municipal Respondents' Brief, supra note 12, at 6.
337. Seawall, 74 N.Y.2d at 111, 542 N.E.2d at 1068, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 551. In Nollan, the
Supreme Court recognized that a land use regulation would not effect a taking if it
"substantially advance[s] a legitimate state interest." Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n,
483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987); see also Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S.
104, 127 (1978) (noting that a use restriction may constitute a taking if not "reasonably
necessary to the effectuation of a substantial government purpose"). The Court does not
require the regulation to solve the problem that it was designed to alleviate.
338. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834.
339. Seawall, 74 N.Y.S.2d at 111, 542 N.E.2d at 1068, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 551.
340. Seawall Reply Brief, supra note 283, at 37-38; 459 West Brief, supra note 24, at 35-38.
341. 459 West Brief, supra note 24, at 36-37.
342. Municipal Respondents' Brief, supra note 12, at 39 (citing NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN.
CODE § 27-198.2[d][4][a][ii] (1987) (providing that replacement units must be affordable to
persons of low and moderate income)). Accordingly, the operation of Local Law No. 9
allowed, but did not require, SRO owners to replace the units with SRO's.
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Ironically, a more restrictive law-one requiring owners to rent to the
homeless and construct SRO's for replacement units-might have
withstood challenge because the court might have viewed it as
directly related to curing homelessness.
Finally, the Seawall court determined that in equating the cure of
homelessness with dollars, the exorbitant rates for the buy-out provi-
sions prove that the obligations placed on a few property owners are
the type of burdens that should be borne by the City as a whole.343
There were seven thousand property owners similarly burdened. 3 "
Notably, the Seawall court did not try to distinguish the Landmarks
Law in Penn Central 34 which designated four hundred346 out of over
four million buildings in New York City347 as landmarks. Noting
that landmarking was part of a comprehensive plan to preserve struc-
tures of historic or aesthetic interest, the Supreme Court held the
landmark law constitutional. 48 Similarly, as the Seawall court stated,
"the end sought to be furthered by Local Law No. 9 is of the greatest
societal importance-alleviating the critical problems of homeless-
ness."3 49 Thus, Local Law No. 9 should have been upheld as a com-
343. Seawall, 74 N.Y.2d at 112, 542 N.E.2d at 1069, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 552. For example, at
$45,000 per unit, it would cost 459 West 43rd Corp. $9,720,000 to buy out its 216 units. 459
West Brief, supra note 24, at 33. Sutton East would pay $1,395,000 to buy out its 31 units.
Brief for Plaintiff-Appellants Sutton East-86 at 50, Seawall (No. 20891/86). Seawall
Associates would have to pay approximately $5,000,000. Seawall Reply Brief, supra note 283,
at 37. Even though these amounts seem extraordinary, and have even been described as a
"ransom," 459 West Brief, supra note 24, at 31-32, the selling price of similarly developed real
estate in New York City shows that the buy-out provisions are reasonable.
The site of an SRO ... was redeveloped after its owner exercised his option to
"buy out" a 51 unit SRO building at a cost of $2,295,000. A 57 story luxury
tower is standing in its place and the developer is currently offering cooperative
apartments for sale at prices ranging from $462,000 to $4,500,000.
Intervenor's Brief, supra note 11, at 64 n.30.
However, Local Law No. 9 does contain one real deficiency. The rent-up provisions
require owners to fill available space, creating tenancies protected by rent control and eviction
laws. An owner who later decides to exercise his buy-out option would not only have to pay
the $45,000 per unit to free up each unit, but also would have to negotiate with existing tenants
to terminate legal tenancies created by Local Law No. 9. Thus, the owner could end up paying
substantially more than $45,000 per unit to purchase his freedom under Local Law No. 9.
Additionally, the possibility of tenant hold-outs exists. The owner conceivably could be forced
to remain in the SRO rental business far longer than the framers of Local Law No. 9 likely
intended. Seawall Brief, supra note 14, at 53-54.
344. N.Y. Times, Dec. 14, 1989, at A18, col. 5.
345. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
346. Id. at 132.
347. In his dissent, Justice Rehnquist exclaimed, "Appellees have imposed a substantial
cost on less than one one-tenth of one percent of the buildings in New York City for the
general benefit of all its people." Id. at 147 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
348. Id. at 132-38.
349. Seawall Assocs. v. City of New York, 74 N.Y.2d 92, 111, 542 N.E.2d 1059, 1068, 544
N.Y.S.2d 542, 551, cert denied, 110 S. Ct. 500 (1989).
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prehensive plan to prevent a further increase in homelessness by
preserving SRO's.
C. Conclusion
If other jurisdictions choose to follow Seawall, municipalities'
abilities to fashion innovative programs to meet the housing crisis
could be seriously jeopardized. Laws requiring rental of units to the
poor, even if only temporarily, would be invalidated as per se tak-
ings.35 0 Restrictions on housing demolition or conversion, even those
providing hardship exemptions, may be invalidated on conceptual
severance grounds. Also, notwithstanding the Supreme Court's
admonition in Keystone, Seawall encourages courts to entertain facial,
as opposed to "as applied," challenges in cases raising allegations of
unconstitutional takings of private property. 51
Facial invalidation is perhaps the most damaging aspect of the
Seawall opinion. As our nation faces a housing crisis which has been
all but ignored by the federal government,3 52 local legislatures need
flexibility to create innovative solutions. Facial invalidation thwarts
these efforts before policymakers have time to determine if the pro-
gram works. In both Nollan and Penn Central, the Supreme Court
focused on the economic viability and means/ends analyses. This
approach allows the reviewing court to assess the actual impact of the
ordinance in light of a specific factual record. Moreover, this
approach presupposes that experimental programs, like Local Law
No. 9, will have at least some time to work. Otherwise, courts will
have no factual basis for determining whether the law has any positive
effect on the problem it was designed to address, and whether it
causes specific properties to become "economically unviable."
Requiring this type of as-applied analysis neither guarantees that cre-
ative programs will be constitutional nor that they necessarily will
solve complex social problems. It merely requires property owners to
prove their inability to earn a reasonable rate of return, so that prom-
ising programs to solve such problems are not scrapped on the basis of
unsubstantiated fears. The City enacted Local Law No. 9 after seri-
350. Other courts have upheld anti-warehousing and anti-demolition provisions in laws
designed to preserve low-income housing. See Help Hoboken Hous. v. City of Hoboken, 650
F. Supp. 793 (D.N.J. 1986) (upholding law requiring landlords to rent vacant apartments to
tenants); see also Terminal Plaza Corp. v. City of San Francisco, 177 Cal. App. 3d 892, 223
Cal. Rptr. 379 (Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (upholding city ordinance requiring residential hotel
owners to provide relocation assistance to residents prior to conversion of hotel to any other
use).
351. For a discussion of facial attacks, see supra notes 119-29 and accompanying text.
352. See supra note 2.
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ous consideration and research into the problem of increasing home-
lessness in New York City. 353 To invalidate the law before it has a
chance to work, or before property owners prove any economic dam-
age, critically chills legitimate City efforts to solve a pressing social
problem.
V. ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVE PROGRAMS IN
LIGHT OF SEA WALL
Seawall is not a Supreme Court opinion.354 Therefore, it is bind-
ing only on New York courts. However, courts often look to sister
states for persuasive reasoning in matters of first impression. This
Section attempts to predict arguments that, Seawall suggests, may be
made under the federal takings clause355 to invalidate other programs
designed to preserve, create, or require rental of low-income housing.
It presents a summary discussion of preservation programs, anti-
warehousing ordinances, anti-displacement measures, and linkage
programs 356 in light of Seawall to determine whether Seawall's exten-
sions of the takings jurisprudence will have any negative impact on
their constitutionality.357 Generally, the format that follows sets forth
the provisions of the particular ordinance, predicts the results of a
takings challenge under the Supreme Court's jurisprudence, and then
compares that result with an anticipated result under Seawall's analy-
sis, involving the use of conceptual severance on a facial attack.
353. See supra notes 6-25 and accompanying text.
354. The Supreme Court denied certiorari. Seawall Assocs. v. City of New York, 110 S. Ct.
500 (1989).
355. The takings argument is just one of several arguments a plaintiff could advance to
invalidate a program imposing restrictions or fees on developers or landowners. See Help
Hoboken Hous. v. City of Hoboken, 650 F. Supp. 793 (D.N.J. 1986) (challenging ordinance as
violation of due process and equal protection, as void for vagueness, and as violating federal
antitrust laws); Terminal Plaza Corp. v. City of San Francisco, 177 Cal. App. 3d 892, 223 Cal.
Rptr. 379 (Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (challenging ordinance as invalid tax, violation of substantive
due process and equal protection, adopted without proper environmental review or statutory
authority); Bonan v. City of Boston, 398 Mass. 315, 496 N.E.2d 640 (1986) (challenging
ordinance as adopted without proper statutory authority); San Telmo Assocs. v. City of
Seattle, 108 Wash. 2d 20, 735 P.2d 673 (1987) (challenging ordinance as invalid tax).
356. Linkage programs are not limited to housing programs. They may require developers
to provide affordable housing, low-income housing, job training or related community services.
M. STEGMAN & J. HOLDEN, NONFEDERAL HOUSING PROGRAMS 58 (rev. June 12, 1987).
This discussion, however, is limited to housing programs.
357. Although states are free to disregard Seawall, owners and developers will likely argue





In 1979, the Board of Supervisors of the City and County of San
Francisco enacted a moratorium on the demolition or conversion of
residential hotel units. 359 The moratorium was a response to a serious
housing shortage for low-income and elderly residents caused by the
conversion of residential hotels to tourist hotels or condominiums.
In 1981, the Board replaced the moratorium with a permanent regula-
tion known as the Residential Hotel Unit Conversion and Demolition
Ordinance. 361 The regulation's stated objective is to alleviate "the
adverse impact on the housing supply and on displaced low income,
elderly and disabled persons resulting from the loss of residential
hotel units through their conversion and demolition. '362
The ordinance requires owners of residential hotel units to obtain
a permit prior to conversion of the property to any other use.363 The
permit is conditioned upon the owner providing relocation assistance
to hotel residents and making a one-for-one replacement of the units
being converted in one of three ways: the owner must either construct
new units, renovate existing units, or pay a fee to the city's Residential
Hotel Preservation Fund.361 The California Court of Appeals upheld
the ordinance against several challenges.365
The San Francisco ordinance is similar to New York's Local
Law No. 9, but distinguishable in one very important respect. It does
not mandate continuous residential rental of vacant units at rent-con-
trolled rates. 366 Arguably, it was this anti-warehousing provision that
New York property owners found most offensive and which caused
the Seawall court to find Local Law No. 9 both a per se and a regula-
tory taking. On a takings challenge, the California appellate court
358. Plaintiffs have challenged at least two municipal ordinances designed to preserve low-
income housing in state courts. One was invalidated as an illegal tax. San Telmo Assocs. v.
City of Seattle, 108 Wash. 2d 20, 735 P.2d 673 (1987). The other was upheld as a proper
preservation measure. Terminal Plaza Corp. v. City of San Francisco, 177 Cal. App. 3d 892,
223 Cal. Rptr. 379 (Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
359. Terminal Plaza, 177 Cal. App. 3d at 898, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 381.
360. Id.
361. SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., ADMIN. CODE, ORDINANCE No. 330-81, ch. 41 (1981).
362. Id. ch. 41, § 41.2.
363. Id. ch. 41.
364. Terminal Plaza, 177 Cal. App. 3d at 898, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 381. The required fee
would be 40% of the construction cost of the number of units converted. Id
365. See supra note 355.
366. The ordinance "specifically permits a residential hotel to rent any vacant residential
unit to tourists during the designated tourist season, May 1 to September 30." Bullock v. City
of San Francisco, 221 Cal. App. 3d, 1072, 1081, 271 Cal. Rptr. 44, 47 (Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
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correctly held that the San Francisco ordinance did not cause a per se
taking because there was no permanent physical invasion of the prop-
erty.367 Although it did not find a regulatory taking either,368 the case
was decided prior to Nollan.369 While the court did express concerns
about the disproportionate burden placed on select property owners,
it ultimately deferred to the legislature's judgment.370 In light of Nol-
lan, and the analysis in Seawall, would the California ordinance now
be found to work a taking?
2. ANALYSIS UNDER SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE
Under Nollan, a California court first would determine whether
the San Francisco ordinance substantially advances a legitimate state
purpose. 37 1 In Terminal Plaza Corp. v. City of San Francisco,372 a Cal-
ifornia appellate court found that the purpose of the ordinance was to
maintain a healthy supply of rental housing373 and that it "serves a
legitimate governmental interest.., by means reasonably and directly
related to its goals."' 374 Assuming that the city can substantiate a
nexus between the demolition or conversion restrictions and the alle-
viation of the housing shortage for low-income and elderly residents,
Nollan's substantial relationship test would be satisfied.375
In that event, the court would undertake an economic analysis,
367. Terminal Plaza, 177 Cal. App. 3d at 911, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 390. The ordinance only
affected economic use. Id. at 912, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 390.
368. Terminal failed to offer evidence that it was not receiving a reasonable rate of return on
its investment from operation of the property as a residential hotel. Id. at 912, 223 Cal. Rptr.
at 391. Nor did it prove that the market value of the property was diminished because of the
ordinance. Id. In light of the fact that Terminal retained the right to sell or trade its property,
and to use it in the same manner that it had prior to the enactment of the ordinance, the
property remained economically viable. Id. "[I]n any event, a land use regulation which
merely decreases the value of property does not constitute a compensable taking." Id.
369. Terminal Plaza was decided in 1986. Nollan was decided in 1987. In fact, in Nollan,
the Court chastised California courts in general for upholding laws where no nexus could be
shown. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 839-40 (1987).
370. The court noted:
We are concerned that the ordinance places a disproportionate share of the
burden of providing low cost housing upon residential hotel property owners,
rather than fairly dispersing the cost of conferring such a social benefit upon
society as a whole. But we cannot intrude upon the legislative decision-making
process by substituting our views for the wisdom of the Board.
Terminal Plaza, 177 Cal. App. 3d at 912, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 391.
371. For a discussion of the first prong of the Nollan test, see supra note 139 and
accompanying text.
372. 177 Cal. App. 3d 892, 223 Cal. Rptr. 379 (Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
373. Id. at 909, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 389.
374. Id. at 910, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 389.
375. The Supreme Court specifically stated that the nexus was more than a pleading
requirement. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 841 (1987).
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the second part of the Nollan test.376 If the court applied Supreme
Court jurisprudence, the law likely would be valid. In Terminal
Plaza, the California appellate court already rejected Terminal's argu-
ment for application of the conceptual severance theory by refusing to
equate Terminal's property rights "with a 'bundle of sticks,'" which
Terminal claimed had been destroyed by the ordinance.377 Instead,
the court, in an as-applied economic analysis, weighed the Penn Cen-
tral 378 balancing factors and determined that the ordinance did not
destroy economic use because Terminal could continue to use its
property in the same manner that it had before enactment of the ordi-
nance. 379 Further, Terminal failed to prove that the ordinance frus-
trated its investment-backed expectations or that it could not earn a
reasonable rate of return.38 0 In sum, a court following the Supreme
Court's analysis likely would uphold the San Francisco ordinance on
both a facial and an as-applied attack, even in light of Nollan.38'
3. ANALYSIS UNDER SEA WALL
In view of Terminal Plaza's rejection of conceptual severance, it
is unlikely that a California court would both revisit the issue in a
later challenge to the ordinance's validity and adopt Seawall's con-
ceptual severance analysis. If a California court were to do so, how-
ever, it might invalidate the ordinance on a facial attack3 82 by finding
that the ordinance abrogates two essential property rights: the rights
of use and disposition.38 3 The ordinance abrogates the right of use
because owners cannot develop their property without paying a fee or
constructing replacement units.384 It abrogates the right of disposi-
tion because as long as the units are burdened with the restriction, the
376. See id. at 834 (quoting Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)).
377. Terminal Plaza, 177 Cal. App. 3d at 911, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 390.
378. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
379. Terminal Plaza, 177 Cal. App. 3d at 912, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 391.
380. Id.
381. The court did not perform a facial attack analysis, which under Supreme Court
jurisprudence would inquire whether the "mere enactment" of the law made Terminal's
property economically unviable. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480
U.S. 470, 494 (1987) (citing Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S.
264 (1981)). For a discussion of facial attacks, see supra notes 119-29 and accompanying text.
Nevertheless, the ordinance likely would survive a facial attack because the court found that
Terminal was able to sell its property, use its property in the same manner as before the
restriction, or convert its property upon compliance with the restrictions, and that Terminal
had not shown a reduction in market value. Terminal Plaza, 177 Cal. App. 3d at 911-12, 223
Cal. Rpt. at 390-91.
382. Seawall Assocs. v. City of New York, 74 N.Y.2d 92, 108-10, 542 N.E.2d 1059, 1066-
68, 544 N.Y.S.2d 542, 549-51, cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 500 (1989).
383. Id. at 110, 542 N.E.2d at 1067, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 550-51.
384. Terminal Plaza, 177 Cal. App. 3d at 898, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 381. The Terminal Plaza
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law impedes the owner's ability to sell the property.385
One might argue that Seawall's analysis should not apply
because the San Francisco ordinance, unlike Local Law No. 9, does
not abrogate the right of possession because it does not require prop-
erty owners to rent their vacant units on a continuous basis.38 6 There-
fore, the ordinance abrogates only two essential sticks in the bundle of
property rights-not three. Although Seawall involved abrogation of
three essential sticks in the bundle-use, possession, and disposi-
tion387 -the Seawall opinion implies that abrogation of just one stick
in the bundle would be enough to cause a taking. 8 Thus, an owner
of residential hotel units could argue that abrogation of two essential
sticks-use and disposition-would constitute a taking under Sea-
wall.3 8 9 If a court agreed, validity of the ordinance would be ques-
tionable under a Seawall analysis, and a facial attack using conceptual
severance would be possible. Just the opposite result would obtain,
however, under the Supreme Court's analysis in Nollan.
B. Anti- Warehousing Programs
1. THE ORDINANCE
In 1986, the City Council of Hoboken, New Jersey, determined
that Hoboken was experiencing a low-income rental housing
shortage.3 ° It found that the housing emergency was exacerbated by
owners warehousing available affordable housing units which kept
them from the rental market. 39 ' The city responded by enacting an
court did not discuss whether the development rights were transferable, a factor which could
save the law under a Penn Central analysis. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
385. See Seawall, 74 N.Y.2d at 108, 542 N.E.2d at 1066, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 549.
386. In Seawall, the court found that the anti-warehousing provision allowed persons not
yet in possession to occupy the SRO units, thereby abrogating Seawall's right to possession.
Id. at 106, 542 N.E.2d at 1065, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 548.
387. Id. at 107-10, 542 N.E.2d at 1066-68, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 549-51.
388. Id. at 110, 542 N.E.2d at 1067, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 550 ("IT]he permanent abrogation of
one of those rights, without regard to its comparative value in relation to the whole, may well
be sufficient to constitute a taking.").
389. This is a weak argument because every zoning regulation or nuisance law limits use
and disposition to some extent. See, e.g., Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926)
(zoning law caused 75% diminution in property value); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394
(1915) (prohibition on brickmaking caused 87.5% diminution in property value). Seawall
really turns on the abrogation of possession issue, which is the major factor distinguishing it
from other takings cases. See supra note 386.
390. "'[T]he elimination of a substantial portion of the existing affordable rental housing
stock, and insufficient new construction of affordable rental housing ...have caused a
substantial and increasing shortage of rental housing affordable by families of low and





ordinance which requires owners to re-rent apartment units, at rent-
controlled rates, within sixty days of a vacancy.392 The ordinance
provides a maximum $500 daily fine if owners fail to rent or obtain a
waiver, 393 and it exempts owners who plan to convert their buildings
to condominium or cooperative ownership.394
2. ANALYSIS UNDER SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE
Property owners facially attacked the ordinance as a taking in
Help Hoboken Housing v. City of Hoboken.39' The Help Hoboken
decision was issued before the Supreme Court's Nollan decision. Con-
sequently, the Help Hoboken court, on a substantive due process chal-
lenge, asked whether the restrictions imposed on property owners
were rationally related,396 rather than substantially related,397 to the
purposes of the ordinance. The purpose of the law was to "protect
the rights of tenants during the present affordable housing crisis,"398
both by requiring rental of vacant units and by giving tenants the
right to purchase a condominium or cooperative at prices specified in
the ordinance.39 9 The court noted that the rent-up provisions fur-
thered the purposes of "keep[ing] more units occupied in the short
term, '" 40 and that the interrelationship with the rent-control laws
"seem[ed] to be a rational way to protect the tenants' state-granted
right to buy their units in the event of condo or co-op conversion."' ,
Today, under Nollan, the court would require a tighter nexus between
the means and ends of the law by asking whether the restrictions
imposed on property owners are substantially related to the purposes
392. Hoboken, N.J., Ordinance V-51, Ordinance Prohibiting the Withholding of Certain
Residential Units from the Rental Housing Market Within the City of Hoboken (June 18,
1986).
393. Id. The Rent Levelling Board can grant a waiver for maintenance and improvement
reasons or if the landlord wishes to keep a unit vacant for occupation by a member of his or
her family. Help Hoboken, 650 F. Supp. at 795-96.
394. The owner must give the tenant a 60-day notice of the intent to convert, advise the
tenant of the right to purchase a unit, and file a plan of conversion with the city. Id. The
ordinance also exempts owner-occupied buildings of four or fewer units and buildings
participating in "'an affordable housing project.'" Id.
395. 650 F. Supp. 793, 797 (D.N.J. 1986). The court noted that the claim was premature
because the ordinance had never been enforced. Id. at 798.
396. Id. at 799.
397. For a discussion of the first prong of the Nollan test, inquiring whether the restrictions
imposed upon property owners are substantially related to the purposes of the law, see supra
note 139 and accompanying text.
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of the law. °2 In that regard, city studies and surveys, although not
constitutionally required, would be helpful to substantiate this
nexus. 40 3 Assuming that a court would find a substantial relationship
between the rent-up and tenant purchase provisions and alleviation of
the housing emergency, the ordinance likely would be constitutional
because it already has survived a facial challenge.
In Help Hoboken, a New Jersey federal district court upheld the
ordinance on a facial attack, finding that landlords "ha[d] not been
deprived of all 'economically viable' use of their property"'' because
"landlords . . remain free to rent their apartments to paying ten-
ants," 5 and could remove their buildings from the rental market by
filing a plan of conversion to condominium or cooperative ownership
with the city.' Because the ordinance had not yet been enforced, °7
the court did not address whether the ordinance, as applied to partic-
ular developers who desired to convert their properties to commercial
use, would work a taking.- The court rejected claims, however, that
the "ordinance [would] interfere with the investment-backed expecta-
tions of Hoboken redevelopers,"" holding that in the absence of a
concrete dispute, "[loss of future profits [is] ... a 'slender reed upon
which to rest a taking claim.""' Thus, even though the ordinance
required landlords either to rent their property, pay a fine, or file a
plan of condominium or cooperative conversion with the city, no tak-
ing resulted.4"' By the same token, the ordinance is weak because it
allows rental properties to be upgraded to condominium or coopera-
tive ownership. Thus, it would do little to alleviate the low-income
rental housing crisis or displacement resulting from removal of rental
housing from the market. This phenomenon, referred to as gentrifica-
tion, has been documented as actually aggravating displacement. 4 1
402. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
403. Nollan does not specifically require studies, but states that the nexus between ends and
means is to be "more than a pleading requirement." Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n,
483 U.S. 825, 841 (1987).
404. Help Hoboken, 650 F. Supp. at 798 (quoting Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining &
Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 296 (1981) (quoting Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260
(1980))).
405. Id.
406. Id. The property owners' real claim was that once the units were rented, they would
be subject to rent control laws. Id. The court disposed of this claim by noting that the
landlords were free to attack the constitutionality of those laws. Id. at 798 n.6.
407. Id. at 798 ("[P]laintiff's claim is at best premature ... [b]ecause the ordinance has
never been enforced ... .
408. Id.
409. Id. (quoting Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 66 (1979)).
410. Id.
411. For a discussion of the gentrification phenomenon, see sources cited supra note 9.
[Vol. 45:467
STONEWALLED BY SEAWALL
3. ANALYSIS UNDER SEA WALL
A comparison of the Hoboken ordinance with Local Law No. 9,
however, shows that as to owners desiring to convert their properties
to commercial use, rather than to cooperative or condominium own-
ership, the Hoboken ordinance could work both a permanent physical
occupation and a regulatory taking under Seawall. 4'2 First, mandated
rental of the units by tenants not already in possession would consti-
tute a taking under Seawall's permanent physical occupation the-
ory.413 Second, under a regulatory takings analysis, a New Jersey
court, utilizing a conceptual severance analysis on a facial challenge,
could find that the rights of use, possession, and disposition are abro-
gated as they were in Seawall.414  The right of use is abrogated
because the ordinance does not allow property owners to demolish,
alter, or convert their properties to commercial use, although they can
convert to condominium or cooperative ownership.415 The right of
possession is abrogated because the ordinance forces owners to re-rent
their vacant units.41 6 Finally, the right of disposition is abrogated
because by prohibiting commercial redevelopment and mandating
rental, the Hoboken ordinance likely "impairs the ability of owners to
sell their properties for any sums approaching their investments, 41
7
assuming they purchased the properties for a premium in anticipation
of redevelopment." 8 Abrogation of these three essential "sticks" in
the bundle of property rights would constitute a regulatory taking
412. The ordinance only allowed owners to convert to condominium or cooperative
ownership and required landlords to give tenants the right "'to purchase ownership in the
premises at a specified price.'" Help Hoboken, 650 F. Supp. at 796.
413. The court based Seawall's permanent physical occupation holding on the rent-up
provisions alone. Seawall Assocs. v. City of New York, 74 N.Y.2d 92, 102-06, 542 N.E.2d
1059, 1062-65, 544 N.Y.S.2d 542, 545-48, cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 500 (1989). The Seawall trial
court distinguished the anti-warehousing provision of Help Hoboken from Local Law No. 9
because the ordinance in the Help Hoboken case allowed owners to remove their buildings
from the residential market. Seawall, 138 Misc. 2d 96, 106, 534 N.Y.S.2d 958, 968 (Sup. Ct.
1987), rev'd, 142 A.D.2d 72, 534 N.Y.S.2d 958 (App. Div. 1988), rev'd, 74 N.Y.2d 92, 542
N.E.2d 1059, 544 N.Y.S.2d 542, cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 500 (1989). However, the New York
Court of Appeals did not even consider whether exemptions allowing owners to remove their
buildings from the burden of the ordinance would save it from a per se taking. Seawall, 74
N.Y.2d at 102-06, 542 N.E.2d at 1062-65, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 545-48.
414. See supra notes 243-45 and accompanying text.
415. Seawall, 74 N.Y.2d at 108, 542 N.E.2d at 1066, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 549.
416. Id.
417. Id.
418. The Help Hoboken opinion states that the plaintiff, an unincorporated association of
developers, attacked the law claiming that "the passage of th[e] ordinance will interfere with
the investment-backed expectations of Hoboken redevelopers." Help Hoboken Hous. v. City
of Hoboken, 650 F. Supp. 793, 798 (D.N.J. 1986). The court, however, summarily dismissed
the claim for "[Il]oss of future profits," id. (quoting Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 66 (1979)),
refusing to entertain it "until a concrete dispute, focusing on a specific instance of an
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under Seawall's conceptual severance theory.419
Notably, a court following the Seawall court's analysis could
invalidate the Hoboken ordinance under the conceptual severance
theory, whereas a New Jersey federal district court-following
Supreme Court jurisprudence-did not.420 The Help Hoboken court
applied the correct test for a facial challenge-whether "mere enact-
ment" of the law "denies an owner economically viable use of his
land" 42 -and upheld the law. 422 Because owners are free to rent to
paying tenants and can seek exemption by conversion to condomin-
ium or cooperative use, their property remains economically viable.423
According to the Help Hoboken court, any other claim, such as a
claim that the ordinance prohibits conversion to commercial use,
would have to be made on an as-applied basis. Consequently, the
unwarranted extension of facial attacks and conceptual severance by
Seawall could adversely affect another innovative program---one sub-
stantially similar to Local Law No. 9-before giving it chance to
work.
C. Anti-Displacement Programs
As the following discussion will illustrate, anti-displacement
measures, if reasonable, would likely survive both an analysis under
Supreme Court jurisprudence and an analysis under Seawall's con-
ceptual severance theory. Therefore, it may be the type of program a




In 1985, the City of Seattle enacted its Housing Preservation
Ordinance to "provide relocation assistance to low-income persons
displaced by demolition or change of use."'425 Section 9 of the ordi-
enforcement of [the] ordinance, [was] before the court." Id. (citing Williamson County
Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985)).
419. See Seawall, 74 N.Y.S.2d at 107-10, 542 N.E.2d at 1065-68, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 548-51.
420. Help Hoboken, 650 F. Supp. at 798.
421. Id.
422. Id. at 796-97.
423. Id.
424. See infra notes 511-12 and accompanying text.
425. SEATrLE, WASH., MUNICIPAL CODE § 22.210.020(B)(1) & (4) (1985), invalidated by
R/L Assocs. v. City of Seattle, 113 Wash. 2d 402, 404, 780 P.2d 838, 839 (1989). An earlier
case invalidated another section of this ordinance restricting the demolition of low-income
housing as an illegal tax. See San Telmo Assocs. v. City of Seattle, 108 Wash. 2d 20, 735 P.2d
673 (1987).
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nance limited eviction426 and section 10 required owners to assist in
relocating displaced tenants.427 In 1986, R/L Associates ("R/L")
purchased a house that had been rented to low-income tenants since
1982.428 It obtained a demolition permit that the city revoked when it
learned that R/L had not complied with the ordinance. 29 On appeal,
R/L contended that the ordinance effected a taking of its property.4 30
The Washington Supreme Court invalidated the ordinance as an ille-
gal tax43 I and declined to reach the taking issue.4 32
2. ANALYSIS UNDER SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE
If a developer challenged an ordinance like Seattle's preservation
ordinance on takings grounds, it is unlikely that it would constitute a
taking under either a Nollan or a Seawall analysis. First, the city
designed the ordinance to provide relocation assistance to low-income
persons displaced by demolition and conversion of rental units.433
The Supreme Court recently has recognized that "during a housing
shortage, the social costs of dislocation of low-income tenants can be
severe." 434 Accordingly, alleviating tenant hardship through reloca-
tion likely would be considered a legitimate state interest. The ordi-
nance would substantially advance that interest because a payment
requirement furthers the goal of alleviation of dislocation. Second,
426. Section 22.210.090 (Section 9) provides that tenants cannot be evicted during the 180-
day period prior to application for a demolition license unless an enumerated good cause
exists. A tenant evicted in violation of this section is entitled to relocation assistance.
SEATTLE, WASH., MUNICIPAL CODE § 22.210.090 (1985), invalidated by R/L Assocs., 113
Wash. 2d at 404, 780 P.2d at 840.
427. Section 22.210.100 (Section 10) requires owners to assist in relocating low-income
tenants by either relocating them to comparable housing or making an in lieu payment not to
exceed $2,000. The amount of the payment depends on the tenant's income. SEATTLE,
WASH., MUNICIPAL CODE § 22.210.100 (1985), invalidated by R/L Assocs, 113 Wash. 2d at
404, 780 P.2d at 840.
428. R/L Assocs., 113 Wash. 2d at 404, 780 P.2d at 840.
429. Id. at 405, 780 P.2d at 840.
430. Id. at 406, 780 P.2d at 840. R/L also claimed that the ordinance was an invalid
exercise of the city's police power to regulate the development of land, the same reason the San
Telmo court struck the demolition restriction. Id. at 406 & n. 1, 780 P.2d at 840 & n. 1; see San
Telmo Assocs. v. City of Seattle, 108 Wash. 2d 20, 24, 735 P.2d 673, 675 (1987).
431. RIL Assocs., 113 Wash. 2d at 409-10, 780 P.2d at 842. The court's decision rested on a
state statute providing that "[n]o county, city, town, or other municipal corporation shall
impose any tax, fee, or charge, either direct or indirect, on the construction or reconstruction
of residential buildings." Id. at 406, 780 P.2d at 840-41. The court held that the payment of
relocation assistance is an indirect charge on development and thus, is facially invalid. Id. at
409, 780 P.2d at 842.
432. Id. at 410, 780 P.2d at 842.
433. Id. at 404, 780 P.2d at 839.
434. Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 1 n.8 (1988). The Court upheld an ordinance
allowing hearing officers to consider tenant hardship when approving a rent increase proposed
by the landlord. Id.
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under an economic impact analysis, property owners may be unable
to claim that a maximum $2,000 payment per tenant4 35 renders their
property economically unviable.436 The merits of this argument
would depend on the size of the existing development.
3. ANALYSIS UNDER SEA WALL
Under Seawall's conceptual severance analysis, an owner could
argue that a burden on development rights is a taking of an essential
"stick" in the bundle of his property rights.437 However, it is unlikely
that a court would invalidate the law based on a burden on, or even
an abrogation of, developments rights alone. The Supreme Court
already has held such a result untenable in Penn Central Transporta-
tion Co. v. City of New York,438 where it upheld the Landmark Preser-
vation Law even though the law restricted Penn Central's ability to
alter or develop Grand Central Terminal. 439 Although the Seattle
ordinance does not provide for transferability of development rights,
as the Landmark Preservation Law did in Penn Central, the economic
impact of the Seattle ordinance on the property is not comparable to
the economic impact of the Landmark Law on Penn Central. Penn
Central lost millions of dollars in yearly revenues" ° while property
owners subject to an ordinance like the Seattle ordinance would face a
one-time $2,000 per tenant fee."' Thus, assuming that the property
remains economically viable, an ordinance like the Seattle ordinance
likely would be valid under either traditional Supreme Court analysis
or Seawall's analysis.
D. Linkage
A number of American cities have developed "linkage pro-
grams""' 2 to provide much needed low-income housing. Contribu-
tions by developers to a local governmental fund in return for certain
desired governmental actions, including the issuance of subdivision
approval, the granting of a special or conditional use permit, an
435. RIL Assocs., 113 Wash. 2d at 404, 780 P.2d at 840.
436. For a discussion of economic analysis, see supra notes 109-18 and accompanying text.
437. Seawall Assocs. v. City of New York, 74 N.Y.2d 92, 542 N.E.2d 1059, 544 N.Y.S.2d
542, cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 500 (1989).
438. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
439. Id. at 138; see also Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (upholding
zoning although restricting development).
440. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 116.
441. R/L Assocs. v. City of Seatle, 113 Wash. 2d 402, 404, 780 P.2d 838, 840 (1989).
442. This discussion is limited to the housing linkage programs enacted in San Francisco,
Boston, and Miami. Not all linkage programs, however, deal with housing. Some pertain to
child care and employee training. See M. STEGMAN & J. HOLDEN, supra note 356, at 58.
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amendment to a zoning map, or some other land use approval or per-
mit are called "exactions." 44 3 A linkage program is simply an innova-
tive form of exaction, generally requiring developers of commercial
space additionally to construct housing elsewhere in the community
or to contribute monies for the creation of such housing. 4 A per-
centage of the monies, usually twenty percent, is set aside for creation
of this low-income housing.44 The rationale for imposing linkage
obligations is to satisfy the need for housing that downtown office
development generates by bringing new employees to the city." 6
Policymakers believe that developers who have contributed to this
need should be required to satisfy a portion of the increased housing
demand," 7 establishing the link between the cause of the harm and
the burden imposed.448 As the following analysis illustrates, a prop-
erly substantiated linkage program with reasonable fees and a large
threshold likely would survive a takings analysis. However, linkage
may not be a useful tool in alleviating the housing crisis in all cities.
Successful linkage programs usually are found only in cities with
booming downtown economies. 49
1. SAN FRANCISCO
a. The Ordinance
San Francisco enacted the Office Housing Production Program
("OHPP") in 1981 after the city determined that a causal connection
existed between large-scale downtown development and the need for
443. Connors & Meacham, Paying the Piper: What Can Local Governments Require as a
Condition of Development Approval?, INST. ON PLAN. ZONING & EMINENT DOMAIN § 2.02[1],
at 2-2 (1986). Eighty-eight percent of all communities employ some form of exaction. Best,
New Constitutional Standards for Land Use Regulation Portents of Nollan and First English
Church, 145 HOFSTRA PROP. L.J. 145, 146 (1988).
444. The San Francisco linkage program only requires developers of new office construction
to create housing or to contribute to a housing fund. M. STEGMAN & J. HOLDEN, supra note
356, at 64. Conversely, the Boston linkage program requires all large-scale commercial
developments to contribute to a fund. Id.
445. Id.
446. Taub, Exactions, Linkages, and Regulatory Takings: The Developer's Perspective, 20
URB. LAW. 515, 524 (1988); see also Connors & Meacham, supra note 443, at 2-25.
447. Collin & Lytton, Linkage: An Evaluation and Exploration, 21 URB. LAW. 413, 427
(1989).
448. Id.
449. Id at 426. Professor Rachelle Alterman believes that cities should consider linkage
programs only as temporary measures. Alterman, Evaluating Linkage, and Beyond, LINCOLN
INT. LAND POL., Feb. 1989, at 61. Alterman argues that linkage is sensitive to market
changes because it taps only a narrow range of potential donors currently in a high-profit
category. Id. at 60. The most reasonable approach is to consider linkage as a temporary
solution for creating needed housing while searching for more sound permanent solutions. Id.
at 61.
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additional low- and moderate-income housing.45 ° The city revised the
OHPP guidelines and adopted a linkage ordinance in 1985 to create
the Office Affordable Housing Production Program ("OAHPP").45 '
The OAHPP requires developers of new or substantially rehabilitated
downtown office projects proposing the net addition of 25,000 or
more gross square feet to provide housing452 or contribute a fee of
$6.94 per square foot to a housing fund. 3 The linkage fee is trig-
gered by the 25,000 square foot threshold. Hence, if the proposed
project is less than 25,000 square feet, no fee is imposed; if it exceeds
25,000 square feet, a fee is imposed on the entire net addition.
b. Analysis Under Supreme Court Jurisprudence
Although property owners have not legally challenged the hous-
ing program,454 property owners subject to it may claim that exaction
fees constitute a taking. If so, a court using the Nollan test would first
ask whether the ordinance substantially advances a legitimate govern-
mental purpose. 455 The stated purpose of the OAHPP is to provide
housing for additional employees who are attracted to the city by
large-scale office development.45 6 A court would find this to be a
450. M. STEGMAN & J. HOLDENsupra note 356, at 59.
451. "Large-scale office developments in the city and county of San Francisco ... have
attracted and continue to attract additional employees to the City, and there is a causal
connection between such developments and the need for additional housing in the City,
particularly housing affordable to households of low and moderate income." City & County of
San Francisco, Office Affordable Housing Production Program Ordinance 358-85 (July 19,
1985) (codified as amended at SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., PLANNING CODE § 313 (1990)).
452. SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., PLANNING CODE § 313.4(1), .5 (1990). If the developer elects
to cause housing to be constructed, the number of units to be constructed is calculated by
multiplying the net additional square footage by .000386. Id. § 313.5(1). Sixty-two percent of
the units constructed must remain affordable to low- and moderate-income households for 50
years. Id. Low- and moderate-income households are defined as households with incomes less
than 120% of the regional median. M. STEGMAN & J. HOLDEN, supra note 356, at 64.
453. SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., PLANNING CODE § 313.6 (1990). The city increased the fee
from $5.78 to $6.94 effective January 1, 1991. Telephone interview with Olson Lee, Chief
Housing Finance Officer, City of San Francisco (Jan. 29, 1991). The funds received are
deposited into the affordable housing fund and are used solely to increase the supply of housing
for low- and moderate-income households. SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., PLANNING CODE § 313.12
(1990). According to the December 1988 Annual Evaluation, the program has generated
$28,094,143 in contributions and has produced 5,690 housing units under the OHPP Interim
Guidelines of 1985. Telephone interview with Olson Lee, supra.
454. Taub, supra note 446, at 541. Office developers unsuccessfully have challenged the
hotel conversion and transit fee ordinances. Terminal Plaza Corp. v. City of San Francisco,
177 Cal. App. 3d 892, 223 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1986); see supra notes 359-65 and accompanying
text.
455. For a discussion of the first prong of the Nollan test, see supra note 139 and
accompanying text.
456. See supra note 451. Another purpose of the ordinance would be to provide housing for
residents displaced by persons attracted to the city by new office employment.
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legitimate state purpose based on studies that the city had conducted
to document the relationship between housing needs and office devel-
opment.4" The city found the following: forty percent of new office
workers would seek housing in the city if it were available; a typical
worker occupies 250 square feet of office space; and the average resi-
dential unit contains 1.8 employed adults.458  The information gener-
ated by these studies would substantiate the Nollan nexus as long as
the housing fund is used to build houses for additional employees
attracted to the city.459
If the ordinance passes the substantial relationship test, the sec-
ond prong of the Nollan test requires the court to perform a multi-
factor4" economic analysis." 1  This as-applied analysis requires the
court to determine the affect of the restriction on particular proper-
ties.462 Under the San Francisco program, once the project reaches
the 25,000 square feet threshold, the linkage fee would be at least
$173,500, and could exceed one million dollars,463 depending on the
size of the project. Because this exaction may render properties eco-
nomically unviable, a court could find the San Francisco ordinance
unconstitutional as applied to large development projects.
Conversely, the San Francisco linkage program likely would sur-
457. See supra note 451 (study prepared by Recht Housrath & Assocs.) (July 19, 1984). In
this regard, a developer wishing to challenge a program should conduct its own surveys and
studies to document the lack of such a relationship.
458. M. STEGMAN & J. HOLDEN, supra note 356, at 62-63. Studies determined that "the
cost of providing affordable housing to persons attracted to large office developments is $9.47-
$10.47 per square foot." Id at 64. However, in recognition of the numerous assumptions that
were made, the city halved the estimate. Id.
459. A court should make an equal protection inquiry into whether it is fair only to subject
commercial office developers to the linkage requirements. The OAHPP excludes retail
businesses, federal and state government office buildings, and office developments built on San
Francisco Redevelopment Authority land. SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., PLANNING CODE
§ 313.3(2) (1990). As long as the city has evidence that office development employs more
persons per square footage of space than other uses, however, singling out commercial office
developers to bear the burden should be valid.
460. The court would apply the multi-factor balancing test set forth in Penn Cent. Transp.
Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). For a discussion of this test, see supra notes
109-18 and accompanying text.
461. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987) ("We have long
recognized that land-use regulation does not effect a taking if it 'substantially advance[s]
legitimate state interests' and does not 'den[y] and owner economically viable use of his land
.. ') (quoting Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)).
462. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 294, 295 (1981)
("These 'ad hoc, factual inquiries' must be conducted with respect to specific property, and the
particular estimates of economic impact and ultimate valuation relevant in the unique
circumstances."). Keystone reaffirmed this principle. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v.
DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 495 (1987).
463. Once the development is over 144,100 square feet, the payment would be greater than
one million dollars.
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vive a facial challenge. Under Supreme Court jurisprudence, the test
is whether the mere enactment of the ordinance "denies an owner
economically viable use of his land.'' 64 Here, because the ordinance
provides all developers with at least 25,000 square feet of unimpeded
development rights, their properties retain some commercial viability.
Thus, the ordinance should be valid, unless it is virtually impossible to
build an office project in San Francisco without exceeding the 25,000
square foot threshold.
A creative developer's argument, however, would be that a court
should view his development rights as two separate segments. The
first 25,000 square feet of unimpeded development rights would be
one segment; the remaining development rights would constitute the
second segment. The developer could then argue that his develop-
ment rights in his second segment (the segment over 24,999 square
feet) are adversely affected by a large linkage fee. As to this segment,
he has no exempted threshold, and thus, no guarantee of economic
viability. This argument is essentially Penn Central's argument
regarding the effect of the Landmark Preservation Law on Grand
Central Terminal.465 It claimed that its property should be separated
into segments to determine whether air space in which it had not yet
built had been taken by the Landmark Preservation Law.4 66 The
Supreme Court rejected Penn Central's argument, holding that prop-
erty rights are not separated into discrete segments.467 Instead, the
court looks at the effect of the. ordinance on the property as a
whole.468 Similarly, a California court following Supreme Court anal-
ysis likely would uphold the linkage ordinance, based on Penn Cen-
tral, because, viewing the developer's property as a whole, at least
24,999 square feet of unimpeded development rights remain, guaran-
teeing the developer some economic use of his property.
c. Analysis Under Seawall
A court would come to the exact same conclusion under Sea-
wall's conceptual severance analysis. Although the Seawall court
extended conceptual severance beyond traditional bounds, it did so
only where it perceived that Local Law No. 9 totally abrogated one or
more of the rights to use, possession, and disposition.469 Because
464. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 495-96.
465. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31 (1978).
466. Id. at 130.
467. Id.
468. Id.
469. Seawall Assocs. v. City of New York, 74 N.Y.2d 92, 108-10, 542 N.E.2d 1059, 1066-
68, 544 N.Y.S.2d 542, 549-5 1, cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 500 (1989).
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some development rights remain unimpeded under the San Francisco
ordinance, namely 25,000 square feet, it is unlikely that a court fol-
lowing Seawall's analysis would extend the conceptual severance the-
ory to subdivided individual rights. Otherwise, the concerns of the
Keystone majority would come to fruition because allowing property
to be chopped up in this manner could cause all land use regulations
to be deemed takings.47 ° Thus, although a California court following
Seawall's analysis might consider that abrogation of all development
rights constitutes a taking, it probably would not extend this concept
to apply only to abrogation of development rights over the 25,000
square foot threshold, assuming the property remained economically
viable. In that regard, an owner would have to concede, at least on a
facial attack, that he retained some economically viable use of his
property by virtue of the 25,000 square foot threshold. This mini-
mum viability is all that is required on a facial attack, and is why the
Supreme Court has said that a challenger faces an uphill battle in
making a facial attack.47'
In sum, validity of the San Francisco linkage program depends
on whether the challenge is made on an as-applied basis or on a facial
challenge. A developer would have a better chance of successfully
challenging the ordinance on an as-applied basis if the contemplated
development over 25,000 square feet is large enough so that the
linkage fee "denies [the] owner economically viable use of his
land. 4 72 Similarly, the city would reap more benefits from a linkage
program by making the amount of square footage exempt from the
law as large as possible so that under an as-applied economic analysis,
the effect of the ordinance on the property as a whole is not dispropor-




In 1983, the Boston Zoning Commission amended its zoning
code to enact a linkage program473 designed to capture some of the
profits from substantial downtown development for use in creating
470. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 498 (1987).
471. Id. at 495.
472. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987) (quoting Agins v.
Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)).
473. BOSTON, MASS., ZONING CODE art. 26 (1983), amended by BOSTON, MASS., ZONING
CODE art. 26A & 26B (1983); see also M. STEGMAN & J. HOLDEN, supra note 356, at 180;
Taub, supra note 446, at 535 n.133.
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sorely needed low- and moderate-income housing.474 The linkage
program requires developers to pay $5.00 per square foot over
100,000 square feet of new or substantially rehabilitated commercial
space473 as a condition precedent to obtaining a discretionary zoning
change.476 The exaction applies to all large-scale real estate develop-
ments including retail, institutional, educational, hotel, and office
projects.477
Property owners challenged Boston's linkage program asserting
that the city lacked statutory authority to impose development exac-
tions.478 While declining to pass on the legality of the linkage pro-
gram, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court suggested that the
state adopt legislation to cure asserted omissions in statutory author-
ity.479 The Boston City Council approved the program in 1986.40
Would Boston's program withstand a takings challenge?
b. Analysis Under Supreme Court Jurisprudence
Under the first prong of the Nollan test, a court would analyze
whether the purpose of the law is substantially advanced by the means
utilized to implement it.48' The purpose of the program is to mitigate
the impact of large-scale development on low- and moderate-income
housing by requiring developers of large projects to create housing or
contribute to a housing fund.482 Prior to its enactment, the city did
474. Taub, supra note 446, at 535.
475. BOSTON, MASS., ZONING CODE § 26A-3(2)(a) (1986). The ordinance exempts projects
under this threshold. Id.
476. The program applies to discretionary zoning changes such as variances, conditional
use permits, exceptions, or zoning map or text amendments. Id. § 26A-3.
477. Id. § 26A-3(2)(a) (Table D).
478. Bonan v. City of Boston, 398 Mass. 315, 496 N.E.2d 640 (1986). The plaintiffs were
property owners located adjacent to the Massachusetts General Hospital. Id. at 315 n.1, 496
N.E.2d at 640 n.1. The Boston Zoning Commission approved the hospital's application to
designate its property as a planned development area under the linkage program. Id. at 318,
496 NE.2d at 642. This amendment permitted increased density ratios for a payment of $3.7
million over twelve years to a charitable trust fund administering the program. Id. at 319 n.8,
496 N.E.2d at 643 n.8. The plaintiffs challenged the ordinance as unauthorized by the city's
zoning enabling statute. Id. at 317, 496 N.E.2d at 642. The trial court agreed and entered a
final declaratory judgment on a motion to dismiss. Id. The Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts reversed on the basis that the plaintiffs lacked standing for failure to allege an
actual controversy. Id. at 322, 496 N.E.2d at 645. The court specifically reserved the question
of the legality of the linkage amendment. Id. at 323, 496 N.E.2d at 645.
479. Id. at 323, 496 N.E.2d at 645.
480. See Act of Dec. 17, 1986, Boston, Mass., City Council (Authorizing Certain Actions
by City of Boston to Mitigate the Effects of New Large-Scale Commercial Real Estate
Development (Linkage)); Taub, supra note 446, at 538.
481. For a discussion of the first prong of the Nollan test, see supra note 139 and
accompanying text.
482. Article 26 states:
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not conduct studies to show a nexus between fees imposed on devel-
opers and the creation of low- and moderate-income housing.483
Again, although these studies are not constitutionally required, they
would be helpful in substantiating the nexus. 4 In any event, the
exaction fee would substantially meet the end of creating low- and
moderate-income housing as long as the city used the fees for that
purpose.
In applying the economic analysis prong of the Nollan test, the
court likely would engage in an analysis similar to that discussed in
connection with the San Francisco linkage ordinance. 85 This is
because Boston patterned its linkage program after the San Francisco
linkage program.48 6 This imitation could be risky insofar as any
weaknesses inherent in the San Francisco program, such as the possi-
bility of a successful as-applied takings challenge, would affect the
Boston ordinance as well.487 On the other hand, to the extent that the
San Francisco program would survive a facial attack in light of the
25,000 square foot threshold which guarantees the property owner at
least some economic use of his property, the Boston program would
survive as well. In fact, the Boston program stands a substantially
better chance of being held constitutional under either an as-applied
or a facial economic analysis. This is because the threshold is much
higher (100,000 square feet), and once this threshold is met, the
The purpose of this article is to promote the public health, safety, convenience
and welfare; to prevent overcrowding and deterioration of existing housing; to
preserve and increase the City's housing stock; to establish a balance between
new, large scale real estate development and the housing needs of the City; and to
mitigate the impacts of large scale development on the available supply of low
and moderate income housing, by provisions designed to:
1. Afford review and to regulate large scale real estate development
projects which directly or indirectly displace low or moderate income residents
from housing units or contribute to an increase in the costs of housing.
2. Increase the availability of low and moderate income housing by
requiring developers, as a condition of the grant of deviations from the Zoning
Code or the grant of an amendment to the zoning map or text, to create low and
moderate income housing or to make a housing contribution grant to the
Neighborhood Housing Trust ("Trust").
BOSTON, MASS., ZONING CODE art. 26A (1986); see also Gallogly, Opening the Door for Bos-
ton's Poor: Will "Linkage" Survive Judicial Review?, 14 ENVTL. AFF. 447, 448 (1987).
483. Taub, supra note 446, at 538; see also Connors & Meacham, supra note 443, at 2-25.
484. Nollan does not specifically require studies but states that the nexus between ends and
means is to be "more than a pleading requirement." Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n,
483 U.S. 825, 841 (1987). In any event, later studies should validate the ends/means nexus.
485. See supra notes 460-68 and accompanying text for a discussion of an economic analysis
of the San Francisco linkage ordinance.
486. Collin & Lytton, supra note 447, at 415 (noting that linkage programs are still in their
infancy and are not yet developed enough to warrant premature imitation).
487. See supra notes 460-63 and accompanying text.
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linkage fee is imposed on only the square footage over that threshold.
A developer of a 100,001 square foot improvement would be charged
a linkage fee of only $5.00 under the Boston program as compared to
$694,006.94 under the San Francisco program.4 8 Thus, it would be
difficult for a property owner to claim that the Boston linkage pro-
gram rendered his property economically unviable. In sum, as long as
the city can overcome the Nollan hurdle of establishing an appropri-
ate nexus between the purpose of the law and the burdens imposed on
developers, the Boston program should withstand a takings challenge.
c. Analysis Under Seawall
Again, because Boston patterned its linkage ordinance after the
San Francisco linkage ordinance discussed above, the result in apply-
ing Seawall's conceptual severance theory to the Boston ordinance
would be the same. That is, a court likely would refuse to apply Sea-
wall's conceptual severance theory to subdivided individual develop-
ment rights-the segment of the property over the 100,000 square
foot threshold. Hence, because the property owner has at least
100,000 square feet of unimpeded development rights, the ordinance
would pass the minimum economic viability test and survive a facial
challenge using Seawall's conceptual severance theory.489
3. MIAMI
Miami's linkage program is designed to mitigate the perceived
harm caused by commercial development next to downtown residen-
tial areas.490 Developers are given density bonuses491 in exchange for
contributions toward or the creation of low- and moderate-income
housing.4 92 They have a choice between building housing on the site
or off the site, or contributing to a housing trust fund.493
488. Compare BOSTON, MASS., ZONING CODE § 26A-3(2)(a) (1986) with SAN FRANCISCO,
CAL., PLANNING CODE, § 313.6 (1990). The greater the square footage exempted, the greater
the chance that the court would find the property retained economic viability. See Keystone
Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 497 (1987) (noting that the Court's
"test for regulatory taking requires [the Court] to compare the value that has been taken from
the property with the value that remains in the property").
489. See supra notes 469-72 and accompanying text for an application of Seawall's
conceptual severance theory to the San Francisco linkage ordinance.
490. M. STEGMAN & J. HOLDEN, supra note 356, at 66.
491. Developers are allowed a higher maximum permissible floor/area ratio (FAR),
although the square footage cannot be increased beyond 1.0 square foot of FAR in SPI-5
District and 2.75 times the gross land area in SPI-7 District. MIAMI, FLA., ZONING
ORDINANCES §§ 1556.2.2, 1576.2.2 (1989); see also M. STEGMAN & J. HOLDEN, supra note
356, at 66.




No one has challenged the program yet, probably because it
resulted from a negotiated agreement between the development com-
munity and the city.4 94 In analyzing a takings challenge under Nol-
lan, however, a negotiated agreement does not establish that the
purpose of the program-mitigation of harm caused by additional
development-is substantially advanced by the linkage fee. 95 For
example, since the created housing can be either within the special
district or in a designated redevelopment area,496 developers might
argue that the linkage fee is not directly related to the need for hous-
ing caused by the development. 97 Because the creation of office space
yields housing in the metropolitan area as a whole, however, one
could argue that the location is irrelevant.
As to the economic viability prong of the Nollan test, it is
unlikely that a court would find that the ordinance deprives a devel-
oper of economically viable use of his property. The linkage require-
ments apply only when the developer wants an increase in square
footage over the base amount allowed by existing zoning. 98 Thus,
there would be some economic use of the property allowed by existing
zoning and the developer would be under no compulsion to contribute
toward housing.4 99 On the other hand, if it is virtually impossible for
a developer to build in downtown Miami without deviating from
existing zoning, linkage payments may make the property economi-
cally unviable on an as-applied analysis, similar to the San Francisco
ordinance.
VI. CONCLUSION
Seawall extends the Supreme Court's takings doctrine in three
ways: by expanding the permanent physical occupation theory to
494. M. STEGMAN & J. HOLDEN, supra note 356, at 66.
495. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
496. MIAMI, FLA., ZONING ORDINANCES § 1556.2.2(1) (1989).
497. In the Nollan case, the Court held that the easement across the beach portion of the
Nollan's property did not substantially advance the purpose of creating visual access to the
beach. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 838. Similarly, an increase in the square footage of downtown
development may not necessarily cause an increased need for housing in a community
redevelopment area if housing is not demolished to create the office building. This argument
would apply to any linkage program.
498. M. STEGMAN & J. HOLDEN, supra note 356, at 200.
499. A court following Seawall would not invalidate this program on the economically
viable use standard. There is no conceptual severance issue because the linkage requirements
apply only when the developer requests a density bonus. Accordingly, the ordinance does not
abrogate development rights. Similarly, the ordinance does not abrogate the right to dispose of
the property because it does not impair the property's value. Seawall Assocs. v. City of New
York, 74 N.Y.2d 92, 542 N.E.2d 1059, 544 N.Y.S.2d 542, cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 500 (1989).
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include mandated rentals,100 by expanding regulatory takings based
on the conceptual severance theory, 501 and by promoting facial invali-
dation.50 2 Programs adversely affected by these extensions are those
restricting development by preservation or those mandating rental of
existing buildings. According to Seawall, preservation programs are
invalid because they abrogate use and disposition. 50 3 Consequently, a
court employing Seawall's analysis could facially invalidate the pro-
gram using the conceptual severance theory. In this manner, Seawall
adversely affects a city's ability to initiate innovative programs to pre-
serve a disappearing stock of low-income housing. Mandated rental
programs receive especially harsh treatment under Seawall because
they would be invalidated both as per se and regulatory takings.
Thus, although sorely needed units may sit vacant awaiting redevel-
opment, the municipality is powerless to marshal them for rental.
Linkage programs fare the best under Nollan and Seawall, as
long as the court is satisfied that the means of the law substantially
advance its ends, without making the properties commercially unvi-
able. Because studies show that the success of linkage is limited to
cities experiencing a booming downtown development, however,
linkage may not be the best method to create housing. In periods of
slow growth, for example, linkage may do more harm than good if
developers are persuaded to move elsewhere.5 0°
Municipalities face high risk in enacting restrictive preservation
programs because the United States Supreme Court recently held, in
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County,50°
that even temporary takings mandate payment of damages. 506 Never-
theless, use-restrictive measures may be the most effective short-term
method to preserve housing. The Supreme Court has allowed even
great burdens to be imposed on private property through use restric-
tions as long as the restrictions substantially advance a legitimate
state interest.507 Nollan reaffirms this policy and merely tightens the
500. See supra notes 220-38 & 271-89 and accompanying text.
501. See supra notes 243-45 & 298-312 and accompanying text.
502. See supra notes 321-23 and accompanying text.
503. Seawall, 74 N.Y.2d at 110, 542 N.E.2d at 1068, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 551.
504. See Collin & Lytton, supra note 447. The "golden goose" argument is that linkage acts
as a barrier to new commercial development because firms choose to locate where they will not
have to pay the increased cost represented by the housing fee. Id. at 426.
505. 482 U.S. 304, 322 (1987).
506. Id. at 321 ("[Wlhere the government's activities have already worked a taking of all
use of property, no subsequent action by the government can relieve it of the duty to provide
compensation for the period during which the taking was effective."). The Court limited its
holding to facts showing that a property owner has been deprived of all use of its property. Id.
For a brief discussion of First Lutheran, see supra note 283.
507. For example, Penn Central lost millions of dollars in yearly revenues by enactment of
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means/ends requirement that the means used must substantially
advance the ends of the law.50° It requires courts to look at the basis
for substantiation rather than defer to the legislative judgment. °
Accordingly, with proper substantiation and guidelines ensuring that
the city has not deprived an owner of all use of his property, a housing
preservation measure may be upheld.
Also, unless the restriction causes a permanent physical occupa-
tion, Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CA TV Corp.51° reaffirms a
state's ability to restrict the uses of property. As we face a growing
homelessness crisis, innovative housing programs may be the only
answer to the housing dilemma. Courts must overcome the impulse
to invalidate these innovative programs on facial challenges. They
should reject the Seawall court's extensions of conceptual severance
and the resulting invalidation of innovative programs on mere facial
challenges. At the very least, courts should require the burdened
property owner to prove its inability to make a profit on development.
In this manner, legislatures can attempt to balance society's need to
house the poor against the rights of private property owners.
VII. APPENDIX: CHECKLIST FOR PROPOSED LEGISLATION
The following is a list of factors that municipalities should con-
sider when drafting proposed legislation to preserve or create low-
income housing to alleviate the homelessness crisis. This checklist
incorporates suggestions or omissions noted in the alternative pro-
grams discussed in the previous Section.
A. Power. Courts have invalidated many exaction provisions
because neither the applicable statute, constitution, nor any enabling
legislation authorized municipalities to enact them. 51 ' The drafter
should review the state constitution, state statutes, local home rule
provisions, and/or zoning laws for proper authority. The drafter
should also check for provisions that limit the municipality's power to
the Landmark Preservation Law. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104,
116 (1978).
508. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987).
509. Id. As the Court noted, substantiation of the law is more than a pleading requirement.
Id. at 841. Commentators agree that Nollan imposed a stricter judicial review requirement.
See Lawrence, Means, Motives, and Takings: The Nexus Test of Nollan v. California Coastal
Commission, 12 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 231, 242 (1988); The Supreme Court, 1986 Term-
Leading Cases, 101 HARV. L. REV. 119, 244-45 (1987). No longer will the Court simply defer
to the legislature's judgment.
510. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
511. See Collin & Lytton, supra note 447, at 421-22; Gallogly, supra note 482, at 461-65;
Rose, From the Legislatures, 16 REAL EsT. L.J. 356 (1988).
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exact fees or special taxes.512
B. Definitions. The ordinance should define low- or moderate-
income housing so that it is truly affordable to persons of that sta-
tus. 13 If the housing is defined as "affordable housing," it would be
more helpful to the poor in the community because the rental or
purchase price would then be tied to the person's income, not to some
national average. 51
4
C. Studies."' The city should perform surveys or other empiri-
cal studies to substantiate the purpose of the exaction and the effect of
the particular means chosen in meeting that purpose.5 16 For example,
if the city is considering linkage, it should survey downtown office
512. See R/L Assocs. v. City of Seattle, 113 Wash. 2d 402, 780 P.2d 838 0989); Rose, supra
note 511, at 356-59 (discussing forms of statutory authority and whether or not the fee might
be considered a tax).
513. For example, Peter Marcuse's Model Anti-Displacement Zoning Ordinance defines
"low-income household" as "[a] household earning 50% or less of the median income for
households of that size in the City." Marcuse, To Control Gentrification: Anti-Displacement
Zoning and Planning for Stable Residential Districts, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 931,
app. at 946 (1984-1985). He defines a "moderate income household" as "[a] household
earning 80% or less of the median income for households of that size in the City." Id. "Low-
rent unit" is defined as "[a] dwelling unit available at a rent equal to or less than 25% of the
income of a low-income household, or a unit available for sale at a real current carrying cost
equal to or less than 25% of the income of a low-income household." Id. at 947. "Moderate-
rent unit" is defined as "[a] dwelling unit available at a rent equal to or less than 25% of the
income of a moderate-income household, or a unit available for sale at a real current carrying
cost equal to or less than 25% of the income of a low-income household." Id.
514. See, e.g., SAN FRANCISCO, CAL. PLANNING CODE § 313.1(2) (1990) (The purchase
price annual payment should not exceed 33% of the combined household annual net income;
the rental payment should not exceed 30% of the combined annual net income.); Boston
Globe, Oct. 1, 1989 ("Your Home" Special Section), at 12, col. 1 (" '[A]ffordable' [housing]
... means housing for which a tenant pays a rent that is never more than a fixed percentage-
say 25 percent-of income, no matter how low that income."); see also Rykowski, Florida's
Affordable Housing Demand Far Outstrips Supply, Miami Herald, Oct. 14, 1990, at J2, col. 5
("Homes are considered affordable if the monthly housing payment plus utilities does not
exceed 30 percent of monthly income.").
515. There are three basic tests that state courts use to analyze exactions. The strict rule or
direct benefit test, the specifically and uniquely attributable test, and the rational nexus test.
See Gallogly, supra note 482, at 467. The drafter should check individual state laws for the
specific nexus requirements before conducting studies.
516. The Nollan Court admonished, "We view the Fifth Amendment's property clause to
be more than a pleading requirement, and compliance with it to be more than an exercise in
cleverness and imagination." Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 841 (1987).
Nollan suggests that courts may require an in-depth, empirical analysis demonstrating that the
argument for linkage is in fact justified. Casenote, A Constitutional Standard of Review for
Permit Conditions, Exactions, and Linkage Programs: Nollan v. California Coastal
Commission, 30 B.C.L. REv. 903, 933 (1989). The analysis should reveal in statistical terms
(1) a direct relationship between the construction of office developments and an exacerbation
of the city's housing shortage, (2) that linkage will alleviate it, and (3) that the imposition is
not merely a way to satisfy a wholly public need unrelated to the developer's activity. Id.; see
also Connors & Meacham, supra note 443, § 2.03[2], at 2-26 (noting that a court may
invalidate a local government's exaction program if the government cannot show that its
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workers to substantiate the number of new workers desiring housing
in the immediate area.517 The city should compute square footage
estimates to show how many workers per square foot occupy both a
development and a home. The survey could then reflect the cost of
the housing and its relationship to the office or commercial develop-
ment shown.518 The city also should perform projections on down-
town growth to ensure that linkage is a viable alternative.
D. Purpose. Legislators should carefully word the purpose of
the law to show a direct and substantial nexus between the law and
the ends it is meant to serve. 519 Although Seawall shows that such
wording does not guarantee that a court will not recast its purpose in
a result-oriented manner, it is nevertheless important to make this as
difficult as possible by explicitly drafting a statute which describes a
tight link.520
E. Reciprocity. Legislators should try to provide or describe
some offsetting benefits to the property owners from the functioning
of the program.5 2 1 Again, if benefits are explicitly enumerated and/or
provided, it becomes more difficult for a court to invalidate the law
without addressing them.
F. Alleviate the Economic Burden. Legislators should try to
mitigate the economic burden of the law on property owners. For
example, they should consider offering transferable development
rights in the case of a restriction on demolition, conversion, or build-
ing.522 Further, giving tax rebates for each unit built of low-income or
shortage of low- or moderate-income housing is attributable in part to construction of
downtown buildings, and that the exaction funds will be used to alleviate that pressure).
517. Surveys of downtown workers could determine where they presently live, where they
lived before they began working downtown, how much they pay for rent, their income level,
the reason for accepting their current job, when they located to the area, and why.
518. For example, San Francisco determined "'that the cost to provide affordable housing
to persons attracted to large office developments ... is $9.47-$10.47 per square foot.'" SAN
FRANCISCO, CAL., PLANNING CODE § 313.2 (1990). In recognition of several assumptions
made in the program, this cost was halved. Id.
519. For example, the San Francisco Office Affordable Housing Production Program
preamble states: " 'Large-scale office developments in the city and county of San Francisco...
have attracted and continue to attract additional employees to the City, and there is a causal
connection between such developments and the need for additional housing in the City,
particularly housing affordable to households of low and moderate income.'" Id.
520. New York City characterized Local Law No. 9's purpose as preventing a further
increase of homelessness by preserving the existing stock of SRO's. Municipal Respondents'
Brief, supra note 12, at 8. The Seawall court characterized it as a method to prevent or cure
homelessness. Seawall Assocs. v. City of New York, 74 N.Y.2d 92, 111-13, 542 N.E.2d 1059,
1068-69, 544 N.Y.S.2d 542, 551-52, cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 500 (1989).
521. The Penn Central Court noted that landmark preservation benefitted the owners of
Grand Central Terminal "both economically and by improving the qualify of life in the city as
a whole." Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 134 (1978).
522. The Penn Central Court noted that even though the transferable development rights
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affordable housing would provide an incentive to create housing.
G. Earmarking Funds. The city should earmark the funds
received to be spent exclusively for the claimed purpose.5 23 If the pur-
pose of the law is to create affordable or low- and moderate-income
housing, the city should consider establishing a housing trust.5 24 This
would defeat any claim that the fees are used as general revenue and,
thus, constitute a tax.
H. Fairness. Drafters must keep fairness considerations in
mind when deciding which development projects to include within the
restriction. For instance, the drafter should question whether there is
a demonstrable reason to exclude public buildings, universities, or
retail establishments from the law. 525 If so, that reason should, again,
be explicitly stated. If not, then these types of buildings should be
included within the restriction. The drafter must also consider that
negotiated agreements may be deemed unfair if they "treat similar
projects differently (depending on whether a rezoning is necessary)
[or] different projects similarly (as long as they require rezoning, they
are hit with a linkage obligation). ' '526
I. Resale Restrictions. Drafters should place resale restrictions
in the deed to ensure that houses built or subsidized with housing
trust fund monies remain affordable. Otherwise, linkage funds may
be spent for naught when properties are quickly transferred and
removed from the low-income market.5 27
J. Community Support. Any innovative program will be con-
troversial. The municipality should generate community support by
proposing ideas to the interested developers or property owners so
that they may submit suggestions prior to putting the program in final
form. The municipality should give the public a chance to develop
and submit alternative programs, give suggestions for changes, and
make economic or legal comments. Whether these suggestions are
may not have afforded just compensation, they undoubtedly mitigated whatever financial
burden the Landmark Law imposed. Id. at 137.
523. See Alterman, supra note 449, at 45.
524. See Rosen & Kuta, Housing Trust Funds: The Legal Challenge, 1989 A.B.A. SPEC.
COMM. ON HOUSING & URB. DEV. 1.
525. San Francisco's linkage ordinance is limited to new office buildings. It exempts all
retail businesses, federal and state government office buildings, and office developments built
on San Francisco Redevelopment Authority land. M. STEGMAN & J. HOLDEN, supra note
356, at 64. In contrast, Boston's program imposes linkage requirements on all large-scale
commercial real estate developments, including retail businesses, institutional, educational,
hotel, and office developments. Id. at 64-65.
526. Id. at 69.
527. Id. at 57. Similarly, rental housing created or subsidized by the fund should be
restricted so that the property can be rented only to a low-income person.
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ultimately adopted or not, it is important to try to get-a sense for the
community feeling on the issue. Also, the city may want to fund a
project for a local law school to develop a program, thus transferring
the drafting of the mechanics of the plan out of the hands of those
who might be seen as having a conflict of interest or favoring persons
or entities responsible for large campaign contributions.
K. Flexibility. Programs should be flexible enough to give
housing credits or exemptions to developers engaged in projects creat-
ing low- or moderate-income housing.528 The developer should be
able to make a choice among available alternatives. For example, in a
linkage program, the developer should be able to choose among creat-
ing housing, restoring housing, or paying an in-lieu fee. 529 Also,
developers may be more amenable to the program if fees can be made
in payments over several years. 530 The problem with this option is
that it may take a long time for the city to build up a source of reve-
nue to create the needed housing.
L. Hardship Provisions. The ordinance should exempt a devel-
oper from the restrictions or fees upon proof that he cannot make a
reasonable rate of return on the property.53 The calculation of rea-
sonable rate of return should be realistic and explicit in the law. For
example, the Seawall court felt that Local Law No. 9's hardship pro-
vision was illusory because it was based on the assessed value of the
property as an SRO, and not the current fair market value consider-
ing other possible uses.532  Thus, cities may want to adopt the
approach of other New York courts and calculate reasonable rate of
return based on a percentage of the purchase price plus taxes,
528. Of course, this provision may run the risk of being arbitrary. For example, the linkage
program may cover the downtown area, with housing to be created within one mile of the
district. If the developer creates housing outside of this district, the "link" between the means
and ends might not be met, although one could argue that the entire metropolitan area was
affected. To resolve this objection, the program should provide that housing credits or
exemptions would be given only for low- or moderate-income housing created by other
projects in the same area covered by the ordinance.
529. San Francisco's ordinance provides these options. M. STEGMAN & J. HOLDEN, supra
note 356, at 63.
530. Boston's program allows downtown developers to make their payments over a seven-
year period. Id at 65.
531. The Supreme Court has not defined "reasonable rate of return." In Penn Cent.
Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978), the court assumed that Penn Central
could make a reasonable rate of return, but did not define it. Id. at 129 n.26. In Seawall the
court indicated that an 8.5% return on the assessed value as an SRO was not a reasonable
return. Seawall Assocs. v. City of New York, 74 N.Y.2d 92, 114 n.13, 542 N.E.2d 1059, 1070
n.13, 544 N.Y.S.2d 553 n.13, cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 500 (1989).
532. Seawall, 74 N.Y.2d at 114 n.13, 542 N.E.2d at 1070 n.13, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 553 n.13.
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expenses, and other carrying charges.533 Under this approach, the
developer also must prove that the purchase price did not include a
premium over fair market value in the expectation that the city would
downzone the property. 534
M. Rules and Regulations. The city should promulgate rules
and regulations immediately to effectuate the ordinance's purpose. By
doing so, affected persons have a way to determine their liabilities
prior to purchasing property or making plans for development.
N. Prospectivity. The city should make the program prospec-
tive. In that way, developers or property owners could not claim that
they were induced by prior city policy to purchase investment
property.5 35
0. Severability Clause. The ordinance should contain a sever-
ability clause providing that if any section of the ordinance is found to
be invalid as applied to any person, the remainder of the law and the
applicability of its provisions to other persons or circumstances will
not be affected. Also, the drafter should include a provision that if
any section of the ordinance is found to be facially invalid, the
remainder of the law will not be affected and will remain in full force
and effect.5 36
SUZANNE K. SLEEP
533. Northern Westchester Professional Park Assocs. v. Town of Bedford, 60 N.Y.2d 492,
502-03, 458 N.E.2d 809, 815, 470 N.Y.S.2d 350, 356 (1983).
534. Id.
535. In Seawall, the developers suggested that the City induced them to purchase SRO's for
renovation by enacting the J-51 tax abatement and that after their investments were made, the
City unfairly reversed its policy by repealing the tax abatement, enacting the moratorium on
demolition and conversion, and ultimately, enacting Local Law No. 9, forcing them to
refurbish and rent the units. Seawall Brief, supra note 14, at 10.
536. Severability clauses should be tested by determining if the law still would have bite if a
court invalidated certain provisions. The Seawall court did not even discuss the severability
clause of Local Law No. 9. This is probably because once the court invalidated the anti-
warehousing and anti-demolition provisions, the need for the buy-out, replacement, or
hardship provisions disappeared.
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